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I. INTRODUCTION

Today, the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution covers
most government evidence-gathering activities.' In search and seizure
cases, after determining that the Fourth Amendment applies to an
investigation, the Supreme Court then specifies the Fourth Amendment
standard that governs the law enforcement activity. In some cases, law
enforcement officers must obtain a warrant.2 In other cases, officers must
possess "probable cause,"3 or a "reasonable suspicion."4

1. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. (guaranteeing "the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects").
2. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31-41 (2001) (holding that when federal
agents used a thermal imaging unit to record the heat generated inside of a residence without first
obtaining a warrant, the agents violated the Fourth Amendment); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 354-59 (1967) (holding that where federal agents used a wiretap to eavesdrop on conversations
made from a public telephone booth without first obtaining a warrant, the agents violated the Fourth
Amendment).
3. See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42,46-52 (1970) (holding that police officers
needed probable cause to search an automobile, but the officers did not need a warrant); Schmerber
v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 766-71 (1966) (holding that in a driving under the influence case,
police officers needed probable cause before requiring that a suspect must take a blood test, but the
officers did not need a warrant).
4. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (holding that where a police officer has
reasonable grounds to believe that any suspect is armed and dangerous, the officer may "conduct
a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons
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The Supreme Court's current presumption that the Fourth Amendment
typically covers law enforcement investigations is ahistorical. A review of
history demonstrates that the Fourth Amendment was intended to proscribe
only a single, discrete activity-physical searches of houses pursuant to a
general warrant, or no warrant at all.' The framers never intended that the
Fourth Amendment would apply to other government evidence-gathering
activities.' Accordingly, the Fourth Amendment simply provides no
guidelines for random drug tests, sense-enhanced searches, automobile
checkpoints, and the many other situations where the Supreme Court has
attempted to apply the Amendment.
Part I of this Article examines current doctrine on what constitutes a
"search or seizure" for Fourth Amendment purposes. According to current
doctrine, the Fourth Amendment applies when government evidencegathering activities affect a person's reasonable expectation of privacy.
Applying this standard, the Supreme Court has determined that the Fourth
Amendment covers most government evidence-gathering activities. But the
Court has held that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to some types
of law enforcement investigations. For example, in Oliver v. United
States,7 the Court relied on historical analysis to conclude that the Fourth
Amendment does not apply to police searches in the open fields.'
Part II of this Article reviews historical evidence on the original
understanding of the Fourth Amendment. The historical record defines
precisely what the framers meant when they proscribed "unreasonable
searches and seizures." Specifically, the framers intended that the phrase
"unreasonable searches and seizures" would proscribe only physical
searches of residences pursuant to a general warrant or no warrant at all.

which might be used to assault him").
5. For a further discussion of this historical argument, see David E. Steinberg, High School
Drug Testing and the OriginalUnderstandingofthe FourthAmendment, 30 HASTINGS CON. L. Q.
263, 270-88 (2003) [hereinafter Steinberg, High School Drug Testing].
6. My view of the Fourth Amendment today is profoundly different from the positions that
I expressed in some earlier writings on the Amendment. In those pieces, I argued that the warrant
requirement should apply to a variety of searches that did not involve any physical entry into a
residence. See David E. Steinberg, The Drive Toward WarrantlessAuto Searches: Suggestions
From a Back Seat Driver, 80 B.U. L. REV. 545, 546 (2000) [hereinafter Steinberg, The Drive
Toward Warrantless Auto Searches] (asserting that the Supreme Court's "abandonment of the
warrant requirement for automobile searches is ill-advised"); David E. Steinberg, Making Sense of
Sense-EnhancedSearches, 74 MINN. L. REv. 563, 613-27 (1990) [hereinafter Steinberg, Making
Sense of Sense-Enhanced Searches] (suggesting a new approach for applying the warrant
requirement to sense-enhanced searches, which usually do not involve a physical entry into a
residence). My change in thinking has resulted both from my more complete understanding of
Fourth Amendment history, and from my profound doubts about the viability of current Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.
7. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
8. See id.
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Part III examines a few of the Supreme Court's attempts to apply the
Fourth Amendment in situations other than residential searches. Part III
concludes that if courts continue to apply the Fourth Amendment in cases
that do not involve physical intrusions into the home, such attempts will
be doomed to incoherence. The Fourth Amendment never was intended to
apply beyond house searches. The Amendment simply offers no guidance
with respect to other types of government evidence-gathering activities.
II. MODERN DOCTRINE: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TYPICALLY
COVERS EVIDENCE-GATHERING ACTIVITIES

In determining whether government conduct constitutes a Fourth
Amendment search or seizure, most Supreme Court opinions employ a test
that originated in Katz v. UnitedStates.9 Justice John Marshall Harlan's
concurring opinion in Katz stated a two-part test: "first that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
'0
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.""
After applying the Katz test, most Supreme Court decisions have
concluded--often with little discussion-that a government evidencegathering activity is a Fourth Amendment search or seizure. However,
some opinions have determined that the Fourth Amendment does not apply
to particular government conduct. In Oliver v. United States," the Court
did not employ the Katz test. Instead, the Oliver Court relied on historical
analysis to determine that a search of the open fields was not covered by
the Fourth Amendment. 2
A. The Katz Test: Opinions Concludingthat Government Activity
Constitutes a FourthAmendment Search
The Supreme Court has concluded that most types of government
evidence-gathering activities constitute Fourth Amendment searches. For
example, in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association, 3 the Court
determined that a random drug test accomplished through urinalysis
qualified as a Fourth Amendment "search."' 4 In a relatively brief
9. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
10. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). For discussions of when a government evidencegathering activity amounts to a Fourth Amendment search, see Gregory S. Fisher, Cracking Down
on Soccer Moms and Other UrbanLegends on the Frontierof the FourthAmendment: Is it Finally
Time to Re-Define Searches and Seizures?, 38 WILAMETr L. REV. 137, 141-65 (2002); Peter
Thornton, Note, Police Use ofSense-EnhancingDevices andthe Limits ofthe FourthAmendment,
1977 U. ILL. L. F. 1167,1172-201 (1977).
11. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
12. See id. at 176-84.
13. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
14. Id. at 616-18.
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discussion, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy noted that a chemical analysis of
urine may reveal sensitive medical information. 5 Justice Kennedy also
observed: "Nor can it be disputed that the process of collecting the sample
to be tested, which may in some cases involve visual or aural monitoring
of the act of urination, itself implicates privacy interests."' 6
Similarly, in Kyllo v. United States, 7 the Court held that a scan of a
residence 8with a thermal imaging unit constituted a Fourth Amendment
"search."' In Kyllo, federal agents sought to confirm that Danny Kyllo
maintained a marijuana greenhouse inside his Oregon residence. 9 While
sitting in a vehicle parked across the street from Kyllo's residence, the
agents focused a thermal imaging unit on the residence.2" According to the
thermal imaging unit, the temperature inside of Kyllo's garage was warmer
than the rest of Kyllo's residence, and it was also warmer than the
temperatures inside of neighboring homes.2 ' A subsequent search of
Kyllo's residence revealed more than 100 marijuana plants.22
In concluding that the use of the thermal imaging unit was covered by
the Fourth Amendment, the Kyllo majority began by noting that in most
no'search' at all."23 However, writing
cases, unaided visual observation "is
for the majority, Justice Antonin Scalia then observed that the Kyllo case
involved "officers on a public street engaged in more than naked-eye
surveillance of a home."24 Justice Scalia emphasized that with respect to
the interior of a residence, "there is a ready criterion, with roots deep in the
common law, of the minimal expectation of privacy that exists, and that is
25 Justice Scalia concluded that the use of
acknowledged to be reasonable."
sense-enhancing technology to obtain information about the interior of a
residence constitutes a Fourth Amendment search, "at least where (as here)
the technology in question is not in general public use."26
In United States v. Karo,27 the Court also found that law enforcement
officers had engaged in a Fourth Amendment search.2" In Karo, federal

15. Id. at 617.
16. Id.The Skinner Court ultimately concluded that random urine testing of railway'workers
did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 618-34.
17. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
18. Id. at 40.
19. Id. at 29.
20. Id.at 29-30.
21. Id. at 30.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 32.
24. Id.at 33.
25. Id. at 34.
26. Id.
27. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
28. Id. at 717-18.
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agents placed a beeper in a can of ether.2 9 The agents tracked the beeper to
which James Karo and other defendants were using as a drug
a residence,
30
lab.
The Karo Court concluded that when the federal agents monitored the
beeper inside of the residence, the agents engaged in a Fourth Amendment
search.3 ' Justice Byron R. White described residences as places where "the
individual normally expects privacy free of governmental intrusion not
authorized by a warrant. 32 Accordingly, the federal agents violated the
Fourth Amendment when the agents monitored the beeper inside of the
residence without first obtaining a warrant.33 Several other opinions also
have concluded, often with minimal analysis, that various government
evidence-gathering activities constitute Fourth Amendment "searches. 34
B. The Katz Test: Opinions Concluding that Government Activity
Does Not Constitute a FourthAmendment Search
Although most opinions applying the Katz test have concluded that
government evidence-gathering activities qualify as Fourth Amendment
searches, 35 the Court occasionally has determined that an evidencegathering activity is not a search covered by the Fourth Amendment. In
Smith v. Maryland,36 Maryland police officers used a pen register to record
the phone numbers dialed by a suspect. 37 A pen register records the
numbers dialed from a particular telephone, but not the contents of any
telephone communications.3 " Prior to installing the pen register, police
officers did not obtain a warrant.3 9
The Smith Court upheld the warrantless use of the pen register,
concluding that Defendant Michael Lee Smith had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the phone numbers that he had dialed.4 ° Justice
Harry A. Blackmun asserted that telephone users "typically know that they

29. Id. at 708.
30. Id. at 709-10.
31. Id. at 716.
32. Id. at 714.
33. Id. at 718 ("In sum, we discern no reason for deviating from the general rule that asearch
of a house should be conducted pursuant to a warrant.").
34. See, e.g., Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450 (1990) ("[A] Fourth
Amendment 'seizure' occurs when a vehicle is stopped at acheckpoint."); Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966) (in a driving under the influence case, the process of drawing blood
for a blood test was governed by the Fourth Amendment).
35. See supra text accompanying notes 14-34.
36. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
37. Id. at 737.
38. Id. at 741.
39. Id. at 737.
40. Id. at 742-43.
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must convey numerical information to the phone company; that the phone
company has facilities for recording this information; and that the phone
company does in fact record this information for a variety of legitimate
business purposes."4 And even if the defendant somehow subjectively
believed that the numbers he dialed were private, such a belief would not
be reasonable.42 When the defendant used his phone, he "voluntarily
conveyed numerical information to the telephone company and 'exposed'
that information to its equipment in the ordinary course of business."43
Accordingly, the Smith Court concluded that the pen register was not a
search and was not covered by the Fourth Amendment."
In Californiav. Ciraolo,45 the Court held that aerial surveillance was
not a search and was not covered by the Fourth Amendment.46 Police
officers flew 1,000 feet over Dante Ciraolo's backyard in a private
airplane.47 Using unaided visual surveillance, the officers spotted
marijuana plants growing in Ciraolo's backyard.4" The officers ultimately
seized seventy-three plants from the backyard.49 Prior to the flight, the
officers did not obtain a warrant."
When police officers looked into Dante Ciraolo's backyard, the officers
were scanning the curtilage ofCiraolo's home."1 Court opinions frequently
have concluded that police surveillance of a residence constitutes a Fourth
Amendment search.52 Further, the Supreme Court has held that the Fourth
Amendment protections afforded to a residence extend to the curtilage 3
Accordingly, one might have assumed that the aerial surveillance in
Ciraolowas covered by the Fourth Amendment.54

41. Id. at 743.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 744.
44. Id. at 745-46.
45. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
46. Id. at 215.
47. Id. at 209.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 209-10.
50. Id. at 212.
51. Id. at 212-13.
52. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-41 (2001) (holding that the use of a thermal
imaging device to measure the heat emanating from a suspect's residence constitutes a Fourth
Amendment search); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715-16 (1984) (concluding that when
federal agents monitored a beeper that criminal suspects had unknowingly carried inside of a
residence, the agents engaged in a Fourth Amendment search).
53. See, e.g., United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987) (recognizing that "the Fourth
Amendment protects the curtilage of a house"); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)
("only the curtilage, not the neighboring open fields, warrants the Fourth Amendment protections
that attach to the home").
54. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215. In Ciraolo, police officers looked into the defendant's
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Nonetheless, the CiraoloCourt held that the aerial surveillance did not
constitute a Fourth Amendment search."5 Chief Justice Warren E. Burger
wrote that Ciraolo did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy with
respect to aerial surveillance, because "[a]ny member of the public flying
in this airspace who glanced down could have seen everything that these
officers observed. 5 6 Justice Burger concluded: "The Fourth Amendment
simply does not require the police traveling in the public airways at this
altitude to obtain a warrant in order to observe what is visible to the naked
eye."5' After applying the Katz test, other Fourth Amendment opinions also
have concluded that government evidence-gathering activities do not
58
constitute a Fourth Amendment search or seizure.
C. Oliver v. United States
In Oliver v. United States, 9 the Supreme Court held that the Fourth
Amendment does not apply to police searches in the open fields. 60 When
Kentucky police officers arrived at Ray Oliver's farm, the officers
encountered a locked gate that displayed a "No Trespassing" sign.6' After
the officers walked around the gate on a footpath, the officers eventually
discovered a marijuana field, located more than one mile from Oliver's
house.62 Because of the locked gate and the "No Trespassing" sign, a
federal district court determined that Oliver "had an expectation of privacy
and that the expectation was a reasonable one. 63
However, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not
apply to open fields, such as Oliver's farm. 6" Oliver's attempts to maintain
backyard from an airplane. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at213-14.
57. Id. at 215. See also Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 447-52 (1989) (holding that
surveillance of a backyard greenhouse from a helicopter did not constitute a Fourth Amendment
search); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 234-39 (1986) (where federal agents in
an airplane used a sophisticated camera to photograph an industrial complex, the agents did not
engage in a Fourth Amendment search).
58. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39-44 (1988) (a defendant who left
garbage bags on the curb in front of his house did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the contents of the bags, and a police officer who sifted through the rubbish did not engage in a
Fourth Amendment search); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-85 (1983) (holding that
when police officers used a beeper to track an auto traveling in the public streets, the officers did
not engage in a Fourth Amendment search).
59. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
60. Id. at 181.
61. Id. at 173.
62. Id.
63. United States v. Oliver, 686 F.2d 356,358 (6th Cir. 1982), a/jtd,Oliver v. United States,
466 U.S. 170 (1984) (summarizing the district court's unpublished opinion).
64. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 176-8 1.
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privacy on his farm were irrelevant because "the government's intrusion
upon the open fields is not one of those 'unreasonable searches' proscribed
'
by the text of the Fourth Amendment."65
The reasoning that appears in Oliver is significant. First, the Oliver
Court relied heavily on Fourth Amendment history. The Oliver majority
quoted from an opinion by Chief Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: "'[T]he
special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in
their "persons, houses, papers, and effects," is not extended to the open
fields. The distinction between the latter and the house is as old as the
common law."' 66
Further, the Oliver decision contains an explicit acknowledgment that
the Fourth Amendment simply does not apply to all government evidencegathering activities. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. noted the difference in the
common law treatment of open fields and "land immediately surrounding
and associated with the home,"67 also referred to as the curtilage. Justice
Powell continued: "The distinction implies that only the curtilage, not the
neighboring open fields, warrants the Fourth Amendment protections that
attach to the home."68 Additionally, Justice Powell stressed "'the
overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that69has been embedded in
our traditions since the origins of the Republic.'
D. Summary
The Supreme Court has determined that government evidence-gathering
activities implicate the Fourth Amendment in situations where a person has
a reasonable expectation of privacy. The Court has applied the Fourth
Amendment to exotic investigative techniques, such as random urine

65. Id. at 177. In concluding that a government evidence-gathering activity did not qualify
as a Fourth Amendment search, the Court also did not apply the Katz test in UnitedStates v. Place,
462 U.S. 696 (1983). In Place,the Court held that a canine sniff of luggage "did not constitute a
'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 707. Concluding that the canine sniff
was not governed by the Fourth Amendment, the Place majority emphasized that no other
investigative procedure "is so limited both in the manner in which the information is obtained and
in the content of the information revealed by the procedure." Id. The Place Court held that the
canine sniff did not violate the Fourth Amendment, even though federal agents had used the drugdetecting dog to sniff luggage. Id. The Court previously held that people have a reasonable
expectation of privacy with respect to the contents of a sealed luggage container. See, e.g., United
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977).
66. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 176 (1984) (alteration in original) (quoting Hester v. United States,
265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924)); see also id. at 180 (describing the common law origins of the open fields
doctrine).
67. Id. at 180.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 178 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980)).
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testing, 70 the use of a thermal imaging device, 7' and police tracking of a
beeper that enters a residence.'
But in other cases, the Court has held that government evidencegathering activities are not covered by the Fourth Amendment because the
activities do not infringe on a suspect's privacy. And in Oliver v.United
States,73 the Court held that a search of the open fields does not implicate
the Fourth Amendment, regardless of a defendant's efforts to maintain his
or her fields as a private place.74
As in many other areas of Fourth Amendment law, the Court's
decisions concerning when government evidence-gathering activities
amount to a Fourth Amendment "search" seem arbitrary and inconsistent.
In Kyllo v. UnitedStates,76 the Court held that the use of a thermal imaging
unit constituted a Fourth Amendment search, in part because the unit
intruded on the "sanctity of the home. '77 However, in California v.
78 the Court held that aerial surveillance of a suspect's backyard
Ciraolo,
did not interfere with a suspect's reasonable expectation of privacy, and
thus, such surveillance did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search.7 9
If anything, the aerial surveillance in Ciraolowould seem to involve a
greater intrusion on residential privacy than the use of the thermal imaging
unit in Kyllo. The thermal imaging unit only would inform federal agents
about the heat generated inside of a suspect's house, as compared with the
temperatures inside of neighboring houses.80 Conversely, "[tihe
indiscriminate nature of [the] aerial surveillance""' in Ciraolowould allow
law enforcement officers to view a variety of private activities not only in
a suspect's backyard, but also in the backyards ofthe suspect's neighbors. 2
Nonetheless, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment restricted the

70. See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,618-34 (1989) (holding
that random drug tests of railway workers did not violate the Fourth Amendment).
71. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-41 (2001) (holding that the warrantless use
of a thermal imaging unit violated the Fourth Amendment).
72. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705,716-18 (1984) (holding that when federal agents
did not obtain a warrant before monitoring a beeper that suspects had brought inside of a residence,
the agents violated the Fourth Amendment).
73. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
74. Id. at 182-83.
75. See infra text accompanying notes 234-324 (criticizing Supreme Court decisions in three
areas of Fourth Amendment law).
76. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
77. Id. at 37.
78. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
79. Id. at 212-15.
80. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29-30.
81. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 225 (Powell, J., dissenting).
82. See id. In his dissent, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. also observed that Dante Ciraolo's yard
"contained a swimming pool and a patio for sunbathing and other private activities." Id. at 222 n.7.
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government's use of the thermal imaging device,83 but did not restrict the
government's use of aerial surveillance. 4
Given these puzzling results concerning the extent of Fourth
Amendment coverage, this Article examines the original understanding of
the Fourth Amendment. This discussion demonstrates that the Court today
is invoking the Fourth Amendment in situations where the Amendment
never was intended to apply. In short, the original understanding of the
Fourth Amendment proscribed unlawful physical entries into a residence,
pursuant either to a general warrant or no warrant at all. Outside of house
searches, the Fourth Amendment simply was inapplicable.
III.

THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

The historical record strongly suggests that the Fourth Amendment was
intended only to proscribe physical searches of residences where the search
occurred pursuant to a general warrant, or without any warrant at all. My
originalist argument is not based on the discovery of some new historical
evidence. Rather, the limitation of the Fourth Amendment to house
searches is expressed clearly in familiar Fourth Amendment sources. I am
particularly indebted to the superb research of William Cuddihy and
Thomas Davies. 5 However, I also have benefitted from the fine historical
scholarship of Nelson Lasson, 6 Tracey Maclin, s7 and several other
authors.88

83. In Kyllo, the Court attempted to distinguish Ciraolo on the grounds that private and
commercial flights in the public airways were routine, while the thermal imaging unit "is not in
general public use." Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40; see also id. at 39-40 & n.6.
84. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215.
85. See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the OriginalFourthAmendment, 98 MICH. L. REV.
547 (1999); William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning, (1990)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School) (on file with author).
86. See NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
TO THE UNITED STATES CoNsTTToN (1937).
87. See Tracey Maclin, Let SleepingDogs Lie: Why the Supreme CourtShould Leave Fourth
Amendment History Unabridged,82 B.U. L. REV. 895 (2002) [hereinafter Maclin, Let Sleeping
Dogs Lie]; Tracey Maclin, The Complexity ofthe FourthAmendment: A HistoricalReview, 77 B.U.
L. REV. 925 (1997) [hereinafter Maclin, The Complexity ofthe FourthAmendment]; Tracey Maclin,
When the Curefor the FourthAmendment Is Worse Than the Disease,68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1994)
[hereinafter Maclin, When the Curefor the FourthAmendment Is Worse Than the Disease].
88. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131,
1175-81 (1991) [hereinafter Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution]; Akhil Reed Amar, The
Fourth Amendment, Boston, and the Writs of Assistance, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 53 (1996)
[hereinafter Amar, The Writs ofAssistance]; Akhil Reed Amar, FourthAmendmentFirstPrinciples,
107 HARV. L. REV. 757 (1994) [hereinafter Amar, FourthAmendment First Principles];Gerard V.
Bradley, The ConstitutionalTheory of the FourthAmendment, 38 DEPAuL L. REV. 817 (1989);
Morgan Cloud, SearchingThrough History; SearchingforHistory,63 U. Cm. L. REV. 1707 (1996)
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A. English HousebreakingLaws: The Early Origins of the
FourthAmendment
William Cuddihy has observed that the modem proscription against
unreasonable searches originated not with concerns about abuses of
government power, but with laws that protected homes against breaking
and entering by private citizens. 9 Cuddihy writes that as early as the
seventh century, English codes "penalized severely those who invaded a
neighbor's premises or provoked a disturbance within it."
By the twelfth century, these codes that prohibited housebreaking had
developed into the crime of hamsocn.9" Cuddihy describes this crime of
housebreaking as "among the more serious ofcrimes in medieval England,
' By the end of the
one hundred shillings being the usual fine for it."92
sixteenth century in England, the crime of hamsocn had been transformed
into more
modem codes that proscribed burglary, housebreaking, and
93
trespass.
Cuddihy observes that the early English laws against housebreaking
acted exclusively as sanctions against private parties, not as restraints on
the government.94 Laws such as hamsocn "sought to control violence by
private persons toward each other, not official searches by the
government." 95
Prior to 1485, searches of private houses by English government
representatives were quite rare. 96 But after 1485, England's Tudor
monarchs profoundly expanded the justifications for and frequency of
house searches conducted by the government. 97 According to Cuddihy:
"Everything from the food that an Englishman put into his mouth and the
cap that he wore on his head to the thoughts circulating in his mind came
to furnish legal pretexts for the government to inspect his home."9 "
Government agents possessed particularly broad powers to search houses

(book review); Joseph D. Grano, Rethinkingthe FourthAmendment WarrantRequirement, 19 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 603 (1982); William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Originsof CriminalProcedure,105
YALE L.J. 393 (1995).

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Cuddihy, supra note 85, at 31-35.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 33.
Id.
Id. at 33-34.
Id. at 36.
Id.
Id. at 75.
Id. at 80-82.
Id. at 81.
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for evidence of customs violations,99 religious heresy,'0 0 and political
dissent.'0 '
As the English Crown's house searches became more frequent and
offensive, English thought began to postulate that certain types of house
searches were unreasonable and unlawful.'0 2 As Cuddihy summarizes this
movement: "Elizabethan Englishmen began to insist that their houses were
castles for the paradoxical reason that the castle-like security that those
houses had afforded from intrusion was vanishing. As the violence and
frequency of searches escalated, the perception that some types of search
and seizure were unreasonable appeared."' °
This historical backdrop sheds considerable light on the eighteenthcentury American opposition to unreasonable searches and seizures, which
culminated in the Fourth Amendment. As the next section illustrates,"°
when eighteenth-century Americans spoke of unreasonable searches or
seizures, these Americans were criticizing one specific practice-the
unlawful physical entry of houses. Americans did not adopt the Fourth
Amendment to impose broad regulations on how law enforcement officers
gathered evidence or effected arrests. Instead, Americans adopted the
Fourth Amendment exclusively to prohibit housebreaking by government
agents, pursuant to a general warrant or no warrant at all.
B. The Controversies That Resulted in the FourthAmendment
When the framers of the Fourth Amendment proscribed unreasonable
searches and seizures, they intended to prohibit physical searches of
residences pursuant to general warrants.'0 5 The term "general warrant"
referred to warrants that contained either of two deficiencies. First, a

99. Id. at 100-02.
100. Id.at 105-07.
101. Id. at 111-18.
102. Id. at 127-28.
103. Id. at 128.
104. See infra text accompanying notes 105-48.
105. The first American constitutional provision to regulate searches and seizures was Article
X of the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776. Article X proscribed general warrants with the
following language:
That general warrants, whereby an officer or messenger may be commanded to
search suspected places without evidence of a fact committed, or to seize any
person or persons not named, or whose offence is not particularly described and
supported by evidence, are grievous and oppressive, and ought not to be granted.
VA. BILL OF RIGHTS, art. X, reprinted in 7 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS 3814 (Francis N. Thorpe ed. 1909) [hereinafter THE
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITrrlONS].
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warrant would be inadequate if the document failed to specify the places
to be searched or the persons to be seized.0 6 Second, a warrant would be
inadequate if the document lacked sufficient evidentiary support for the
search or seizure.'07
As noted by Nelson Lasson, Thomas Y. Davies, and others, discussion
of unreasonable searches in the late eighteenth century primarily focused
on three controversies-the John Wilkes cases in England, Paxton's case
in Boston, and American reactions to the English Townshend Act. 0 8 All
three controversies focused on physical searches of homes pursuant to
general warrants.' 09
1. The John Wilkes Cases
In the eighteenth century, the most well-known examples of
unreasonable searches arose out of an English seditious libel prosecution
brought against opposition politician John Wilkes and his supporters."0 In
April 1763, an anonymous letter printed in an opposition periodical
described the British Tory administration as "'wretched' puppets," and
"the tools of corruption and despotism."'" The Tory government suspected
that John Wilkes was the author of the statement. The government accused
Wilkes and his followers of seditious libel." 2
Pursuant to a general warrant issued by the Tory Secretary of State,
English officers were directed to discover who was responsible for the
13
libelous letter and to search any places that might contain evidence.'
Ultimately, the officers searched at least five houses and arrested at least
106. See id.
(proscribing warrants that allowed law enforcement officials to "seize any person
or persons not named").
107. See id.
(proscribing warrants that authorized officers "to search suspected places without
evidence of a fact committed, or to seize any person.., whose offence is not particularly described
and supported by evidence").
108. See, e.g., LASSON, supra note 86, at 43-48 (discussing the John Wilkes cases); id. at 5763 (discussing Paxton's case); id. at 69-76 (discussing the Townshend Act); see also Davies, supra
note 85, at 561-67 (discussing these three controversies, and noting agreement among
commentators that these controversies represent the most important events leading to the adoption
of the Fourth Amendment).
109. Eighteenth-century Americans contrasted the unlawful general warrant with the lawful
specific warrant. The specific warrant was sworn out by a named complainant. If the search did not
produce evidence of a crime, the complainant was liable for trespass damages. The specific warrant
could be issued only by a neutral magistrate-usually a man of stature. Most significantly, the
warrant gave a specific command to the officer undertaking the search, thus limiting the officer's
discretion. See Davies, supra note 85, at 650-54 (contrasting the specific warrant with the general
warrant).
110. For a detailed account of the John Wilkes cases, see Cuddihy, supranote 85, at 886-927.
I11.Id. at 886.
112. Id. at 886-94.
113. Id. at 886-87.
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forty-nine people pursuant to this single general warrant. 4 Wilkes and his
supporters responded with at least thirty different trespass and false
imprisonment suits." 5
In a series of decisions issued between 1763 and 1769, English courts
ruled that the house searches conducted pursuant to the general warrant
these house
violated English common law." 6 The officers who conducted
17
imprisonment."
false
and
trespass
for
liable
were
searches
For example, in Huckle v. Money, Chief Justice Pratt refused to set
aside a damages verdict won by a printer whose house had been searched
pursuant to the general warrant." 8 In a caustic denunciation of this house
search, Chief Justice Pratt wrote: "To enter a man's house by virtue of a
nameless warrant, in order to procure evidence, is worse than the Spanish
inquisition; a law under which no Englishman would wish to live an hour;
it was a most daring public attack made upon the liberty of the subject."' 9
Wilkes cases included similar criticisms
Other opinions issued in the John
20
searches.
house
unlawful
of
The John Wilkes cases focused exclusively on the impropriety of house
searches pursuant to a general warrant. These cases did not suggest that
similar searches of shops, warehouses, or vessels would violate common
law principles. 2 '

114. Id. at 893.
115. Id. at894.
116. The published opinions that arose out of suits initiated by John Wilkes and his followers
include Money v. Leach, 97 Eng. Rep. 1050 (K.B. 1765); Entick v. Carrington,95 Eng. Rep. 807
(C.P. 1765); Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763); and Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep.
768 (C.P. 1763).
117. See LASSON, supra note 86, at 44-45 (describing the verdicts in the John Wilkes cases,
and noting that the English government's expenses in these cases "were said to total £100,000").
118. 95 Eng. Rep. at 768-69.
119. Id. at 769.
120. See, e.g., Entick, 95 Eng. Rep. at 818 (holding that "to enter a man's house, search for
and take away all his books and papers" violated common law principles); Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at
498 (where "[t]he defendants claimed a right ...to force persons houses, break open escrutores,
seize their papers, &c. upon a general warrant," these actions were "totally subversive of the liberty
of the subject").
121. Eighteenth-century Americans may have lacked access to the actual opinions issued in
the John Wilkes cases. See Davies, supra note 85, at 565 n.25 (noting that the official reports of the
John Wilkes cases "were not published contemporaneously with the trials"). But during the
eighteenth century, these opinions were reported widely in the popular press-both in America and
in England. See, e.g., Cuddihy, supra note 85, at 927-37 (describing British publications that
opposed the use of general warrants in the John Wilkes cases); Davies, supra note 85, at 563
(describing British and colonial newspaper accounts of the John Wilkes cases which emphasized
"the sanctity of the house while condemning general warrants"); see also JACOB W. LANDYNSKI,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

29 (1966) (noting Chief Justice Pratt's popularity in England, following his opinions in the John
Wilkes cases).
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2. Paxton's Case
Charles Paxton was a Boston, Massachusetts customs officer. 2 2 In
1755, Paxton received a writ of assistance from the Superior Court in
Boston.123 In 1761, the Surveyor General of Customs sought to renew the

writ.124 The writ of assistance was the American equivalent ofthe English
125
general warrant.

In January 1761, an association of Massachusetts merchants challenged
Paxton's writ of assistance before the Superior Court in Boston. 126 James
Otis, Jr., a prominent
Boston attorney, argued the case on behalf of the
27
merchants.1

Otis argued that the writs of assistance operated as general warrants, in
violation of common law principles.' 28 Otis initially asserted that "'the
freedom of one's house"' was among "'the most essential branches of
English liberty."", 129 Otis then complained that with a writ of assistance,
customs officials "'may enter our houses when they please-may break
locks, bars and every thing in their way-and whether
they break through
130
malice or revenge, no man, no court can inquire."",

On November 18, 1761, the Superior Court in Boston approved the
continued use of the writs of assistance.' 3' Nonetheless, Otis's argument
against the writ became a watershed moment in the American drive for
independence.32 Some have described Otis's argument against the writ of

Eighteenth-century Americans almost certainly were familiar with the results and reasoning in
the John Wilkes cases, even if these early Americans lacked access to the actual court opinions.
122. Cuddihy, supra note 85, at 760.
123. Id. at 760-61.
124. Id. at 758-64.
125. Id. at 759. Colonial authorities used the writs of assistance to search for customs
violations. The writ authorized customs officers to search any places where the officers suspected
that smuggled goods were hidden. Customs officers believed that these writs empowered them to
enter and inspect all houses in Massachusetts. Id. at 758-59.
The writ was named a "writ of assistance" because the writ compelled all peace officers and
other persons present to assist the customs officers in the performance of the search. See Davies,
supra note 85, at 561 n.18.
126. Cuddihy, supra note 85, at 764.
127. Id. at 765.
128. See id. at 777-78.
129. M.H. SMITH, THE WRITS OFASSISTANCE CASE344 (1978) (quoting Paxton'sCase, Mass.
Reps. 469 (Mass. Sup. Ct. 1761)).
130. Id.
131. Cuddihy, supra note 85, at 798.
132. For John Adams's description ofthe argument made by Otis, see 10 THE WORKS OF JOHN
ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 247-48 (1856) [hereinafter THE WORKS OF
JOHN ADAMS]; see also Davies, supra note 85, at 561-62 n.20 (concluding that "Otis's argument
was widely known in Boston," but expressing uncertainty about whether news of the case reached
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as the most important single event that led to the Revolutionary
assistance
133
War.
It is significant that Otis argued only against house searches. As
Thomas Davies has noted, Otis's clients were "merchants who also owned
ships and warehouses."' 134 But Otis did not challenge the searches of
warehouses 3 or the seizure of ships-only physical intrusions into
residences.
3. American Opposition to the Townshend Act
In 1767, the British Parliament enacted the Townshend Act. 136 The Act
reauthorized the use of writs of assistance by customs officers in
America. 3 But given the profound influence of the John Wilkes cases and
Paxton's case, colonial courts issued the writs sporadically, and customs
officers never executed the writs effectively. 13 As William Cuddihy
describes the implementation of the Townshend Act: "In only a few
colonies did the courts issue the writs as general search warrants, and the
massive searches that those writs authorized were never implemented on
an effective scale.' 39
Like the John Wilkes cases and Paxton's case, opposition to the
Townshend Act again focused on the use of general warrants to authorize
physical searches of residences. At a Boston town meeting in 1772, Samuel
Adams attacked the writs of assistance. 4 Adams asserted, "[O]ur homes

beyond Massachusetts).
133. In Boston, John Adams and other important statesmen attended Otis's argument.
According to Adams, during Otis's argument "American independence was then and there born."
THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 132, at 247. Adams also wrote that Otis's attack on the
writs of assistance was "the first scene of the first act of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great
Britain." Id. at 248.
134. Davies, supra note 85, at 602.
135. Id. at601-02.
136. See Cuddihy, supra note 85, at 1040.
137. Id.
138. See id. at 1046.
139. Id. Cuddihy identifies at least three different reactions to the Townshend Act. In
Massachusetts, judges actually issued the writs of assistance. However, as a result of popular
resistance, customs officers usually were not able to execute effective searches pursuant to the writs.
Id. at 1046-52. In colonies such as Rhode Island, Maryland, and South Carolina, judges either
ignored the writ applications or repeatedly postponed considering these applications. Id. at 1056-57.
The Supreme Courts of Pennsylvania and Connecticut attempted to transform the writs into specific
search warrants. Id.at 1067; see also LASSON, supra note 86, at 73 (noting that most colonial courts
"refused to grant general writs of assistance even after the Townshend Act had set at rest all
technical objections to their legality").
140. A State ofRights ofthe Colonists, reprinted in TRACTS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION,
1763-1776, at 243-44 (Merrill Jensen ed. 1967) [hereinafter A State of Rights of the Colonists]
(report typically attributed to Samuel Adams).
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and even our bed chambers, are exposed to be ransacked, our boxes[,]
chests & trunks broke open ravaged and plundered by wretches ...
whenever they are pleased to say they suspect there are in the house wares
etc. for which the dutys have not been paid."'' Adams continued that
customs officers "break thro' the sacred rights of the Domicil, [and]
ransack mens [sic] houses."' 42 Similarly, Judge William Henry Drayton of
Charleston complained in 1774 that "a petty officer has power to cause the
doors and locks of any man to be broke open, to enter his most private
cabinet, and thence to take and carry
away, whatever he shall in his
143
pleasure deem uncustomed goods."'
The Continental Congress also spoke against house searches conducted
pursuant to writs of assistance. 44 In a 1774 address to the American
people, the Continental Congress protested against the power of customs
officers "'to break open and enter houses without the authority of any civil
magistrate founded on legal information. "" 141 In a 1774 letter to the
inhabitants of Quebec, the Congress warned that British customs officers
would break into "'houses, the scenes of domestic peace and comfort
and
' 46
called the castles of English subjects in the books of their law."" 1
4. Summary
More than anything else, three major controversies led to the adoption
of the Fourth Amendment. Those three controversies were the John Wilkes
cases, Paxton's case, and American opposition to the Townshend Act.
In each situation, critics focused their opposition on unlawful house
searches-not searches of shops, warehouses, or other commercial
establishments. Even more specifically, critics repeatedly asserted that
unlawful searches involved breaking into houses. In 1772, Samuel Adams
complained that customs officers may violate "the sacred rights of the
Domicil" and ransack houses. 47 In 1774, the Continental Congress
denounced customs officers, who could "'break open and enter houses
without the authority of any civil magistrate founded on legal

141. Id. at 243-44.
142. Id. at 244. Like James Otis, Samuel Adams made his argument in the seaport of Boston.
Many members ofAdams's audience undoubtedly were merchants, who owned shops, warehouses,
and ships. Nonetheless, the remarks made by Adams do not refer to unreasonable searches of shops,
warehouses, and ships. In describing unreasonable searches, Adams only discussed house searches.
143. William Henry Drayton, A Letter From Freeman, in 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 15 (R.W. Gibbes ed. 1855) [hereinafter cited as DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION].

144.
145.
146.
147.

Cuddihy, supra note 85, at 1116-17.
Id. at 1116 (quoting Continental Congress to the American People (Oct. 26, 1774)).
Id. at 1117 (quoting Continental Congress to Inhabitants of Quebec (Oct. 26, 1774)).
A State of Rights of the Colonists, supranote 140, at 243-44.
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information."" 48 In defining unreasonable searches, the framers focused
exclusively on unlawful physical entries into houses. The framers did not
criticize surveillance by customs agents unless the agents engaged in
breaking and entering a house.
C. Legal Commentary
English and early American treatises defined unreasonable searches in
the same terms as early American statesmen and attorneys. In discussing
unreasonable searches, legal commentators focused almost exclusively on
unlawful physical entries of houses.
In 1644, Sir Edward Coke described unreasonable searches in the
following terms: "One or more justice or justices of peace cannot make a
warrant upon a bare surmise to break any mans [sic] house to search for a
felon, or for stol[e]n goods ....
Coke continued, "[Flor justices of
peace to make warrants upon surmises, for breaking the houses of any
subjects to search for felons, or stol[e]n goods, is against [the] Magna
Carta .... ,,150
In his 1721 treatise, Sir Matthew Hale expanded on Coke's rejection of
general warrants as ajustification "to break open any man's house."... Like
Coke, Hale condemned the use of general warrants. Hale concluded that
such warrants were "not justifiable," because these warrants gave so much
discretion to the law enforcement officers that the warrants made them "to
be in effect the judge."' 5 2 Also, like other contemporary commentators,
Hale focused exclusively on house searches. In his chapter Concerning
Warrants to Searchfor Stolen Goods, andSeizing of Them,' Hale wrote
exclusively about searches of houses and did not discuss searches
of
4
goods.
stolen
contain
might
also
that
establishments
commercial

148. Cuddihy, supra note 85, at 1116 (quoting Continental Congress to the American People
(Oct. 26, 1774)).
149. SIR EDWARD COKE, THE FOURTH PART OF THE INSTUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 176

(1817). Coke's treatise originally was published in 1644; see Davies, supra note 85, at 578 n.74.
150. COKE, supra note 149, at 177. William Blackstone also emphasized the illegality of
general warrants. Blackstone wrote: "A generalwarrant to apprehend all persons suspected, without
naming or particularly describing any person in special, is illegal and void for it's [sic]
uncertainty .... 4 WILLiAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 288 (1769).
151. See 2 SIR MATrHEw HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 149 (Solemn Emlyn

ed. 1736) (quoting COKE, supra note 149, at 176).
152. Id. at 150.
153. Id. at 149.
154. See, e.g., id. at 150 (concluding that if an officer possesses a specific warrant and "if
stolen goods be in the house, the officer may break open the door"); id. (noting that if an officer
lawfully enters a house to search for stolen goods and no stolen goods are in the house, "the party
that made the suggestion [about the presence of stolen goods] is punishable in such case").
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Early American legal commentators seemed to agree that the Fourth
Amendment merely incorporated the English common law prohibition on
unlawful physical searches of houses, conducted pursuant to general
warrants. In his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States,
Joseph Story devoted just one page to the Fourth Amendment. With
respect to the Amendment, Story wrote: "It is little more than the
affirmance of a great constitutional doctrine of the common law."'
In discussing this "common law" doctrine, Story referred to the English
prohibition on general warrants.' 56 After describing the general warrant,
Story wrote: "In the year 1763, the legality of these general warrants was
brought before the King's Bench [in England] for solemn decision; and
they were adjudged to be illegal, and void for uncertainty.""'

Story

continued that a legal warrant "must not only state the name of the party,
but also the time, and place, and nature of the offence with reasonable
certainty.""

Story's text is significant not only for its content but also for its brevity.
If the framers intended that the Fourth Amendment would regulate a
variety of government evidence-gathering activities, then Story presumably
would have written an extended discussion on the many search and seizure
issues that might arise. No one ever will know with precise certainty why
Story wrote so little about the Fourth Amendment. But the most plausible
explanation is that the scope of the Amendment was limited and applied
only to unlawful house searches.
This assumption is corroborated by Thomas Cooley. In his
constitutional treatise, Cooley emphasized that the Fourth Amendment was
designed to regulate house searches.'
In the treatise section,
Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, Cooley wrote, "The maxim that
'every man's house is his castle' is made a part of our constitutional law
in the clause prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures ....
Cooley continued that the origins of the Fourth Amendment derived from
"the abuse of executive authority, and in the unwarrantable intrusion of
executive agents
into the houses and among the private papers of
' 61
individuals.'

155.

JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1005,

at 709 (Ronald D. Rotunda & John E.Nowak eds. 1987).
156. Id. at 709-10.
157. /d.at710.
158. Id.
159.

THOMAs M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST

UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (1868).

160. Id. at 299-300.
161. Id. at 300.
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If there were any doubts about Thomas Cooley's understanding of the
phrase "unreasonable searches and seizures," Cooley erased those doubts
as a Justice on the Michigan Supreme Court. In the 1874 case of Weimer
v. Bunbury,'62 the Michigan high court reviewed a state statute. The statute
allowed the state to issue a "warrant" authorizing the repossession of
property owned by delinquent tax collectors.'63 The Weimer plaintiff
alleged that this statute violated a Michigan state constitutional provision,
which proscribed unreasonable searches and seizures.1"'
Writing for the Michigan Supreme Court, Justice Cooley upheld the
Michigan repossession statute.' 65 According to Justice Cooley, the
Michigan state constitutional provision outlawing unreasonable searches
and seizures was intended for "something quite different from an open and
166
public levy upon property after the usual method of execution levies."'
Justice Cooley continued that the "main purpose" of the state constitutional
search and seizure provision "was to make sacred the privacy of the
citizen's dwelling and person against everything but process issued upon
a showing of legal cause for invading it."'1 67 Although Weimer involved a
state constitutional provision, Justice Cooley's earlier treatise also
described the Fourth Amendment as exclusively regulating house
searches.16
English and early American legal commentators thus reaffirmed the
original understanding of the Fourth Amendment. In short, the Amendment
was intended to proscribe unlawful physical entries into residences.
Nothing in the early commentaries indicates that the Fourth Amendment
was intended to apply in other contexts.
D. The Dearth of Nineteenth-CenturySearch and Seizure Cases
If the framers intended to regulate a broad variety of government
evidence-gathering activities in the Fourth Amendment, the paucity of
nineteenth-century Fourth Amendment cases is difficult to explain. The
United States Supreme Court did not issue its first Fourth Amendment
169
opinion until 1886, with its decision in Boyd v. UnitedStates.
Federalism may in part explain the lack of early decisions interpreting
the Fourth Amendment. In the eighteenth century and the nineteenth

162. 30 Mich. 201 (1874).
163. Id. at210.
164. Id. at 208; see MICH. CONST. OF 1850. art VI, § 26 (providing that "[tihe person, houses,
papers and possessions of every person shall be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures").
165. Weimer, 30 Mich. at 208, 210.
166. Id. at 208.
167. Id.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 159-6 1.
169. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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century, the Bill of Rights-including the Fourth Amendment-only
applied to the federal government. 170 During this same time period, most
17
criminal laws were enacted by the states, not the federal government. '
Criminal prosecutions almost always took place in the state courts, where
the Fourth Amendment did not apply.
However, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, most state
constitutions contained search and seizure provisions. Often these
provisions used language that was very similar to the Federal Fourth
Amendment. 172 Yet published state court opinions rarely mentioned these
state constitutional search and seizure provisions. 17 Prior to Boyd v. United
States, 174 constitutional search and seizure provisions probably were
discussed in fewer than fifty opinions. In the rare cases where attorneys
argued that law enforcement activities ran afoul of a state constitutional
provision, state courts typically175concluded that the search and seizure
provision had not been violated.
If the constitutional search and seizure provisions really did impose
broad restraints on law enforcement activities, the failure of attorneys and
judges to discuss these provisions is impossible to explain. However, if the

170. See Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. 71, 76 (1855) (rejecting a Fourth Amendment challenge
to a Maryland state statute, because the Fourth Amendment applied only to the federal government).
171. See, e.g., Sara Sun Aeale, Federalizing Crime: Assessing the Impact on the Federal
Courts, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 39, 40 (1996) (noting that federal criminal law
initially had a very limited scope); Thomas J. Maroney, Fifty Years of Federalizationof Criminal
Law: Sounding the Alarm or "Crying Wolf", 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1317, 1319-20 (2000).
Maroney observes that because the eighteenth-century federal government was "small and
conducted few programs, the list of offenses was short." Maroney, supraat 1319-20. At this time,
federal law specified only seventeen criminal offenses. Id.
172. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. OF 1780, pt. 1, art. XIV, reprintedin 3 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 105, at 1891 (guaranteeing that every person had "a right to be secure
from all unreasonable searches, and seizures, of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his
possessions"); PA. CONST. OF 1776, art. X, reprinted in, 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CoNsTrrTUroNS, supra note 105, at 3083 (guaranteeing "[t]hat the people have a right to hold
themselves, their houses, papers, and possessions free from search and seizure"); see also Davies,
supranote 85, at 674-86 (summarizing search and seizure provisions that appeared in eighteenthcentury state constitutions).
173. See Davies, supra note 85, at 611-19 (discussing early search and seizure cases).
174. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
175. See, e.g., Banks v. Farwell, 38 Mass. 156, 158-60 (21 Pick. 1838) (holding that a
warrantless search of a shop did not violate the Massachusetts Constitution, which prohibited
unreasonable searches and seizures); Mayo v. Wilson, 1 N.H. 53, 59-60 (Sup. Ct. N.H. 1817)
(holding that a warrantless arrest did not violate the New Hampshire Constitution, which prohibited
unreasonable searches and seizures); Wakely v. Hart, 6 Binn. 316, 318 (Pa. 1814) (holding that a
warrantless arrest did not violate the Pennsylvania Constitution, which regulated searches and
seizures). But cf Sandford v. Nichols, 13 Mass. (13 Tying) 286, 289-90 (1816) (holding that a
house search conducted pursuant to an invalid warrant probably violated a Massachusetts
constitutional provision, which prohibited unreasonable searches and seizures).
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constitutional search and seizure provisions only applied to unlawful house
searches, the lack of eighteenth-century and nineteenth-century search and
seizure cases makes sense. In early America, attorneys and judges
understood that unless a case involved a physical entry into a house, the
state constitutional search and seizure provisions were just as inapplicable
as the Federal Fourth Amendment.
IV.

HISTORICAL AND TEXTUAL ARGUMENTS OPPOSING THE
HOUSE SEARCH LIMITATION

As discussed above, a broad array of historical evidence indicates that
when the framers enacted the Fourth Amendment, they intended that this
provision would proscribe only unlawful physical entries into residences.
Nonetheless, proponents of a broader Fourth Amendment may raise at least
two arguments based on the text and the history of the Amendment.
First, eighteenth-century Americans protested British seizures of
American ships. The controversy generated by these ship seizures may
suggest that Americans were not exclusively concerned with residential
searches and seizures.
Second, proponents of a broad Fourth Amendment may point to the
language of the Amendment itself. The explicit text of the Fourth
Amendment guarantees the right of the people to be secure not just in their
"houses," but also in their "persons,... papers, and effects."' 76 Proponents
of a broad Fourth Amendment may argue that when the framers added the
"persons,.. . papers, and effects" language, they intended that the Fourth
Amendment would apply in situations other than house searches.
It is impossible to categorically dismiss these arguments against the
house search interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. But on careful
examination, neither the ship seizure cases nor the language of the Fourth
Amendment convincingly demonstrates that the Amendment extended
beyond physical intrusions into houses.
A. The Ship Seizure Cases
The only significant pre-Revolutionary American challenges to nonresidential searches or seizures arose out ofthe British seizure of American
ships, based on allegations of customs violations. The British faced
particularly harsh criticism when they seized ships owned by prominent
merchants Henry Laurens of South Carolina and John Hancock of
Massachusetts.177 Nelson Lasson observes that in Boston during 1768, "a

176. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

177. See Cuddihy, supra note 85, at 1205-14.
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riot resulted when John Hancock's sloop 'Liberty' was seized."' 78 Initially,
these ship seizure cases seem to suggest that eighteenth-century Americans
believed that the phrase "unreasonable searches and seizures" would not
apply exclusively to house searches.'79
However, federal ship seizure cases decided in the early nineteenth
century strongly suggest that the Fourth Amendment never was intended
to apply to vessels. These cases involved federal ship seizure provisions.
The federal provisions permitted ship seizures with only minimal
evidentiary support. Such provisions seem at odds with the Fourth
Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures. But in the
early nineteenth-century ship seizure cases, the FourthAmendment never
even was raisedas an attackon the provisionsauthorizingship seizures.180
In Little v. Barreme,the Supreme Court reviewed a federal statute that
gave federal officers the right "'to stop and examine any ship or vessel of
the United States on the high sea,"' if 'there may be reason to suspect"'
that the vessel was sailing to France.' 8' Under modem readings of the
Fourth Amendment, such broad seizure powers would be highly suspect.
Not only did a Fourth Amendment argument not prevail in Little, but
the Amendment was not even mentioned in the case. The Supreme Court
ultimately held that the ship seizure in Little was improper, but only
because the federal statute did not authorize a seizure of this particular type
of ship.' 82 Little contains no suggestion that this ship seizure statute even
raised a Fourth Amendment issue.
In The Apollon, the Supreme Court dealt with the seizure of a vessel
under a 1799 statute. The statute authorized ship seizures where a vessel
arriving from a foreign port failed to report to a United States customs

178.

LASSON, supra note 86, at 72.

179. See Maclin, The Complexity ofthe FourthAmendment, supra note 87, at 962 (asserting
that the ship seizure controversies "helped to focus colonial thinking on the principle of probable
cause"). But cf Davies, supra note 85, at 604. Davies contends that these ship seizure controversies
did not dispute "general search authority," but instead involved challenges focused on "'customs
racketeering' in the form of hypertechnical applications of customs rules or forfeiture proceedings
based on perjured testimony from informers." Id.
180. In the 1789 Collections Act, Congress approved the warrantless search of vessels for
customs violations. Collections Act of 1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29, 24-25 (1789). Based on this
provision, Chief Justice William Howard Taft concluded that the Fourth Amendment was intended
to apply to ship searches. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 150-51 (1925).
However, if the framers intended that the Fourth Amendment would govern ship searches, it
is unclear why Congress would pass a statute that simply restated the law imposed by the
Amendment. If anything, the Collections Act suggests that Congress needed to enact a law
regulating searches of vessels because the Fourth Amendment did not apply to such searches.
181. 6 U.S. 170, 177 (1804) (quoting Law ofFeb. 9, 1799, ch. II, § 5, 1 Stat. 613-16).
182. Id. at 178-79. Congress only had authorized the seizure of ships sailing from America to
France. Id. at 177. The vessel in Little was sailing from a French port to a Danish port. Id. at 176.
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collector.'83 The Apollon Court held that the ship seizure was not

authorized by the statute because the vessel passed through United States
waters to dock in Florida, at that time a territory of Spain.'84 The Apollon
involved another statute that might seem to run afoul of the Fourth
Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures. But once
again, neither the Court nor the parties ever mentioned the Fourth
Amendment.'85
Why is the Fourth Amendment not discussed in these ship seizure
cases? The most plausible explanation is that both the attorneys and the
Justices understood that the Fourth Amendment simply did not apply to
searches or seizures of ships.
Without question, American colonial merchants deplored British
seizures of American ships. But even after the adoption of the Fourth
Amendment, Americans seemed to believe that regulation of ship seizures
would occur through federal statutes, and not through application of the
Fourth Amendment
For example, in the 1789 Collections Act, Congress approved the
warrantless search of vessels for customs violations.' 86 If the framers had
intended that the Fourth Amendment would govern ship searches, it is
unclear why Congress would pass a statute that simply restated the law
imposed by the Amendment. The Collections Act suggests that Congress
needed to enact a law regulating searches of vessels because the Fourth
Amendment did not apply to such searches. 187 In short, the colonial ship
seizure controversies do not indicate that the Fourth Amendment was
intended to apply to searches and seizures of vessels.
B. The Textualist Counterargument
The argument that the Fourth Amendment only regulates house
searches initially seems inconsistent with the broad, explicit language of
the Amendment. The text of the Fourth Amendment does not simply
prohibit unreasonable searches of houses. Instead, the Amendment
proscribes unreasonable searches or seizures of "persons, houses, papers,

183. 22 U.S. 362, 368 (1824).
184. Id. at 364, 370-72.
185. I have focused on the ship seizure cases because these cases involved an exercise of
federal power. However, Gerard Bradley has pointed out that both early state and federal laws
frequently authorized warrantless searches. Bradley, supra note 88, at 840-46. Bradley cites a long
list of colonial, state, and federal laws that authorized warrantless searches and/or seizures. Id. at
840-44 & n. 154.
186. Collections Act of 1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29, 24 (1789).
187. But cf Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 150-51 (1925) (citing the 1789 Collections
Act as evidence that the Fourth Amendment was intended to apply to ship searches).
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and effects."' 8 This broad language would seem to extend the protections
of the Amendment beyond house searches.
The framers nowhere explicitly stated what they meant by "persons,
houses, papers, and effects."' 89 So it is impossible to categorically reject
the modem interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, which applies the
Amendment to most government evidence-gathering activities. The
framers might have intended that the Fourth Amendment would apply
outside of house searches. And even if the Fourth Amendment only applied
to house searches in the eighteenth century, the framers may have intended
to adopt a flexible and open-ended amendment, which could expand or
contract in the future. 9 ° Nonetheless, the vast preponderance of the
historical evidence suggests that the framers adopted the Fourth
Amendment solely to proscribe unlawful physical intrusions into houses.' 9'
1. The Narrowing of the Fourth Amendment Language
Congress actually narrowed the language of the Fourth Amendment
from the first draft of the Amendment submitted by James Madison. Of the
previously enacted state constitutional search and seizure provisions,
Article XIV of the Massachusetts Constitution most closely resembled the
Federal Fourth Amendment.' 92 This Massachusetts constitutional provision
guaranteed that every person had "a right to be secure from all
unreasonable searches, and seizures, of his person, his houses, his papers,
andallhispossessions."'93 InMadison's first draft, the Fourth Amendment
guaranteed the "rights of the people to be secured in their persons, their

188. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

189. See, e.g., Davies, supra note 85, at 723 n.501 ("There is no record of any debate
regarding the Bill of Rights in the Senate.").
190. For arguments that the Fourth Amendment is a flexible document that should change with
the times, see Davies, supra note 85, at 740-41 (arguing that a return to the original understanding
of the Fourth Amendment "would subvert the purpose the Framers had in mind when they adopted
the text"); Yale Kamisar, The Writings ofJohn Barker Waite and Thomas Davies on the Searchand
Seizure Exclusionary Rule, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1821, 1865 (2002) (arguing that "changing times
and changing circumstances seriously undermined the presuppositions and expectations regarding
the drafting and adoption of the search and seizure provision"); Carol S.Steiker, Second Thoughts
About FirstPrinciples, 107 HARv. L. REV. 820, 824 (1994) (asserting that "the construction of the
Fourth Amendment's 'reasonableness' clause should properly change over time to accommodate
constitutional purposes more general than the Framers' specific intentions").
Legal scholars often argue that constitutional provisions such as the Fourth Amendment should
evolve or change over time. But with respect to questions about how the Fourth Amendment should
grow or evolve, commentators often fail to provide specific answers.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 85-175.
192. See, e.g., Davies, supra note 85, at 554 (describing Article XIV of the Massachusetts
Constitution as "the state provision that most closely anticipated the Fourth Amendment").
193. MASS. CONST. OF 1780, It.1, art. XIV, reprinted in 3 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supranote 105, at 1891 (emphasis added).
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their other property from all unreasonable
houses, their papers, and
194
searches and seizures.
Why did Madison substitute the words "their other property" for the
Massachusetts phrase "all his possessions"? Madison never explained this
change. However, Madison may have sought to protect real property other
than residences, such as shops or warehouses. As Thomas Davies writes:
"[T]he statement of a right to be secure in one's 'property' (without
mentioning 'houses' specifically) may have been intended to serve as a
rhetorical endorsement of the importance of the protection against general
warrants that did not limit the scope of the premises that enjoyed the
protection. 1 95
Ultimately, Congress did not accept Madison's broader language.
Instead, a House of Representatives Committee changed the phrase "and
their other property," to the narrower language "effects. "196 The
Committee's language eventually was adopted in the Fourth Amendment.
Madison never explained why he substituted the phrase "their other
' Nor did the
property" for the Massachusetts phrase "all his possessions." 197
House Committee explain why it ultimately decided to change Madison's
'
language "their other property" and adopt yet a third version: "effects."198
So these relatively small differences in wording may have been purely
stylistic and inconsequential.
On the other hand, when Madison used the words "their other
property," Madison may have signaled a willingness to extend the Fourth
Amendment beyond house searches. And in modifying Madison's
language, Madison's colleagues on the House Committee and in Congress
ultimately may have rejected any such extension of the Fourth
Amendment.' 99
2. The Limited Reach of State Constitutional Provisions
Prior to the ratification of the United States Constitution, a majority of
the original thirteen states had adopted state constitutional provisions that
regulated searches and seizures. 2°' Like the Federal Fourth Amendment,

194. James Madison, Speech to the House of Representatives (June 8, 1789), in 12 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 197, 201 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1977) (emphasis added).
195. Davies, supra note 85, at 709.
196. HOUSE COMM. OF ELEVEN REPORT (July 28, 1789), reprintedin THE COMPLETE BILL OF
RIGHTS: THE DRAFrs, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 223-24 (Neil H. Cogan ed. 1997).
197. See Davies, supra note 85, at 709-10 (concluding that it is uncertain why Madison
departed from the wording of the Massachusetts search and seizure provision).
198. See id. at 710 (noting that "there are no records of the Committee's deliberations").
199. Id. at 711 ("[Tihe Committee's formulation implied that 'houses' were the only type of
premises protected by the right to be secure .... ).
200. Id. at 668-69 (noting that seven of the original thirteen states adopted a declaration of
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many of these state constitutional provisions used language that appeared
to extend beyond house searches. And as is the case for the Federal Fourth
Amendment, no historical evidence suggests that the states intended to
regulate anything other than physical searches of residences.
As discussed above, Article XIV of the Massachusetts Constitution
used wording that was very similar to the language of the Federal Fourth
Amendment. 20 ' Article XIV guaranteed that every person had "a right to be
secure from all unreasonable searches, and seizures, of his person, his
houses, his papers, and all his possessions. 2 2
Yet in the 183 8 case of Banks v. Farwell,2°3 the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court upheld the warrantless search of a shop by law enforcement
officers. 204 Although the Banks Court did not engage in any explicit
discussion about the applicability of Article XIV to commercial premises,
Banks raises doubts about whether the Massachusetts constitutional
provision was intended to apply beyond house searches.
The early Pennsylvania constitutional provision on search and seizure
law also may have been adopted solely to regulate house searches. Enacted
in 1776, Article X of the Pennsylvania Constitution provided: "That the
people have a right to hold themselves, their houses, papers, and
possessions free from search and seizure ."...205
Like the Fourth Amendment, the Pennsylvania Constitution used broad
language that seemed to extend beyond house searches. But in both 1780
and 1785, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted statutes that required
specific warrants for house searches, but not for searches of other
premises.20 6 At a minimum, these statutes indicate that in Pennsylvania,
house searches required stricter controls than searches in other places.
However, these statutes also may .suggest that Article X of the
Pennsylvania Constitution applied exclusively to house searches.20 7
Much later in the nineteenth century, the Michigan Supreme Court
largely limited that state's constitutional search and seizure provision to
house searches. The Michigan Constitution provided: "The person, houses,
papers and possessions of every person shall be secure from unreasonable

rights, with each declaration of rights including a search and seizure provision).
201. See supra text accompanying notes 192-94.
202. MASS. CONST. OF 1780, pt. 1, art. XIV, reprinted in 3 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTrrrIONS, supra note 105, at 1891.
203. 38 Mass. 156 (21 Pick. 1838).
204. Id. at 159-60.
205. PA. CONST. OF 1776, art. X, reprintedin 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 105, at 3083.
206. See Davies, supranote 85, at 681-83.
207. See id. at 678 (asserting that prior commentators on the Pennsylvania Constitution "have
not identified a colonial grievance broader than customs searches of houses under general
warrants").
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searches and seizures.... "20 But in reviewing a state statute that provided
for a "warrant" authorizing the repossession of property owned by
delinquent tax collectors, the Michigan Supreme Court held that the
constitutional search and seizure provision simply was not applicable.2 °9
Instead, Justice Thomas Cooley wrote that the state constitutional
"to make sacred the privacy of the citizen's
provision was designed
2 10
dwelling and person.
As was the case with the Fourth Amendment, state constitutional
provisions used broad language that would seem to extend search and
seizure regulation beyond house searches. And as was the case with the
Fourth Amendment, no historical evidence indicates that the state
constitutional provisions were intended to regulate anything other than
physical searches of residences.
3. The Lack of Discussions Beyond House Searches
If the framers had intended that the Fourth Amendment would apply to
"unreasonable searches and seizures" of "persons, papers, and effects"
outside of houses, 211 one would expect some discussion about when such
non-residential searches would be reasonable. But the historical record is
profoundly silent as to the reasonableness of searches and seizures-with
the sole exception of house searches.
Fourth Amendment doctrine has consistently recognized that the
Amendment simply does not apply to some government investigatory
activities. For example, in the 1924 decision in Hester v. UnitedStates,212
the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to open
fields.213 More specifically, Hesterheld that a bottle of illicit whisky found
in the open fields was not an "effect," as that term is used in the Fourth
Amendment.214 Sixty years later, in Oliver v. United States,215 the United
States Supreme Court reaffirmed its Hester holding.21 6 Oliver reiterated
that the Fourth Amendment does not govern searches in the open fields.21 7
208. MICH. CONST. OF 1850,art. VI, § 26.
209. Weimer v. Bunbury, 30 Mich. 201, 208 (Mich. 1874).
210. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 159-61 (discussing Thomas Cooley's
understanding of the Federal Fourth Amendment).
211. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
212. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
213. Id.at 59.
214. Id. at 58-59 (holding that the Fourth Amendment did not apply when law enforcement
officers seized bottles of illicit whisky, discovered in the open fields).
215. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
216. Id. at 176-84.
217. Id.; see also United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294,303-04 (1987)("Oliver reaffirmed the
precept, established in Hester, that an open field is neither a 'house' nor an 'effect,"' and that the
Fourth Amendment does not apply to searches in the open fields). For a further discussion of the
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Assuming that the Fourth Amendment was not intended to regulate all
government evidence-gathering activities, one would expect some
guidance from the framers about those situations where "persons ...
papers, and effects"2 8 were protected by the Amendment. And yet, sources
from the framing period do not define the places where the Fourth
Amendment was intended to apply, with one notable exception-house
searches. Thomas Davies thus concludes that the framers intended the
Fourth Amendment "to provide clear protection for houses, personal
papers, the sorts of domestic and personal items associated with houses,
and even commercial products or goods that might be stored in
houses-while leaving commercial premises and interests otherwise
'
subject to congressional discretion." 219
4. The Implausibility of Fourth Amendment Literalism
The First Congress enacted the Bill of Rights quickly, and largely
indifferently. James Madison introduced the Bill of Rights before Congress
on June 8, 1789.220 Congress passed the Amendments on September 25,
1789.221 As Leonard Levy writes, members ofthe House of Representatives
responded to the Bill of Rights largely with apathy, indifference, and a
concern that the Amendments would distract the legislators' attention from
more important matters.22 2
Under these circumstances, it seems unlikely that Congress chose the
specific words used in the Bill of Rights with careful precision. As a result,
an emphasis on the literal language of the Amendments ultimately could
contradict the intent of the framers.
For example, the First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no
' And yet governments do make
law.., abridging the freedom of speech."223
laws abridging freedom of speech all of the time. For example, a
government may prohibit anyone from yelling "fire" in a crowded theater
where no fire exists, even though yelling fire is a form of speech.224 And
governments also may prohibit obscenity, another form of speech.225

Oliver decision, see supratext accompanying notes 59-69.
218. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
219. Davies, supra note 85, at 714.
220. 1 ANNALS OFCONGR. 448-59 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
221. Id. at 951.
222. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BI.L OF RIGHTS 34-37 (1999).
223. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
224. This example typically is credited to Oliver Wendell Holmes. See Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
225. See, e.g.,
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20 (1973) (."[I]mplicit in the history of the
First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance....
(quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957))); see also New York v. Ferber, 458
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Similarly, the Second Amendment provides that "the right of the people
to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. ' 22' But the Second
Amendment certainly permits gun licensing laws and other restrictions on
firearms,
even though such laws do affect the right to keep and bear
227
arms.

Just as a literal reading of the First Amendment or the Second
Amendment would not be consistent with the intent of the framers, a literal
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment also is inconsistent with the
framers' intent. The explicit language of the Fourth Amendment prohibits
"unreasonable searches and seizures" of "persons, houses, papers, and
effects., 221 And yet all of the historical evidence suggests that the framers
meant only to regulate searches and seizures of persons, papers, and effects
inside of houses. While the language of the Amendment may offer a
mirage of expansive protection, the framers intended only to proscribe
unlawful physical entries into houses.
C. Summary
Neither the ship seizure cases nor the text of the Fourth Amendment
refutes the overwhelming historical evidence that when the framers
adopted the Fourth Amendment, they only intended to regulate physical
entries into residences. During the eighteenth century, Americans protested
against English seizures of American ships. Despite these colonial
grievances, early nineteenth-century litigation suggests a clear
understanding that the Fourth Amendment simply did not apply to ship
seizures.
Initially, the explicit Fourth Amendment guarantee of the right of
people to be secure in their "persons, houses, papers, and effects" would
seem to offer protection beyond house searches. And yet under both federal
and state constitutional provisions, the only examples of unreasonable
searches or seizures involved government agents breaking and entering
houses. According to the original understanding ofthe Fourth Amendment,
the proscription on unreasonable searches and seizures applied only to
physical searches of houses and the seizure of persons, papers, and effects

U.S. 747,753-64 (1982) (holding that child pornography does not receive any protection under the
First Amendment).
226. U.S. CONST. amend II.
227. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (holding that the Second
Amendment does not guarantee a citizen's right to possess a sawed-off shotgun).
228. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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found inside of houses.229 In other contexts, the Amendment was simply
inapplicable.23 °

229. Akhil Amar advocates an interpretation of Fourth Amendment history that is quite
different from the account presented in this Article. See, e.g., Amar, Fourth Amendment First
Principles,supra note 88; Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution,supra note 88, at 1175-81;
Amar, The Writs of Assistance, supra note 88. Amar's historical argument rests on two critical
propositions. First, like the current Supreme Court, Amar asserts that the framers intended that the
Fourth Amendment would impose a global reasonableness requirement on almost all government
evidence-gathering activities. Amar, FourthAmendment FirstPrinciples,supranote 88, at 801-11.
Second, Amar asserts that the framers actually disfavored searches pursuant to any warrant,
general or specific. Id. at 771-81. According to Amar, the framers did not view the warrant process
as protecting against unreasonable searches. Id. at 774. Instead, civil trespass suits offered the
primary protection from such searches. 1d. Amar contends that the framers disfavored warrants,
because a warrant would provide "an absolute defense in any subsequent trespass suit." Id. Amar
concludes: "Judges and warrants are the heavies, not the heroes, of our story." Amar, The Bill of
Rights as a Constitution,supra note 88, at 1179; see also TELFORD TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: SEARCH, SEIZURE, AND SURVEILLANCE AND FAIR TRIAL AND

FREE PRESS 41 (1969) (also arguing that the framers viewed all warrants as "an enemy").
Although Amar's account is creative and engaging, his contentions often seem at odds with the
historical record. To take just one example, when early American legislatures passed statutes
regulating searches and seizures, those statutes sometimes included a warrant requirement. See, e.g.,
Excise Act of 1791, ch. 15, § 32, 1 Stat. 199, 207 (1791) (requiring that federal customs officers
obtain a warrant before the officers search certain types of buildings for spirits that were concealed
"with intent to evade the duties thereby imposed upon them"); Davies, supra note 85, at 681-83
(noting that in 1780 and 1785, the Pennsylvania Legislature enacted statutes that required specific
warrants for house searches). Although Amar contends that the framers disfavored searches
pursuant to warrants, these early American statutes requiring warrants contradict Amar's
contention.
A number of Fourth Amendment scholars disagree with Amar's reading of Fourth Amendment
history. For detailed critiques of Amar's arguments, see Cloud, supranote 88, at 1739 (arguing that
Amar "selectively deploys incomplete fragments of the historical record to advance a partisan
thesis"); Davies, supranote 85, at 575 n.63 ("Amar is an engaging writer, but his treatment of text
and history is often loose and uninformed."); Maclin, The Complexity of the FourthAmendment,
supra note 87, at 929 ("Amar provides an incomplete account of the [Fourth] Amendment's
history.").
230. Thomas Davies has advanced a reading of Fourth Amendment history that is very similar
to the interpretation presented in this Article. Davies appropriately emphasizes that the historical
concerns resulting in the Fourth Amendment "were almost exclusively about the need to ban house
searches under general warrants." Davies, supra note 85, at 551; see also id. at 642-50
(emphasizing the sanctity of the home in eighteenth-century America).
However, I disagree with Davies on at least two points. Davies concludes that the sole purpose
of the Fourth Amendment was "banning Congress from authorizing use of general warrants." Id.
at 724. "In other words, the Framers did not address warrantless intrusions at all in the Fourth
Amendment or in the earlier state provisions .... " Id. at 551.
In concluding that the Fourth Amendment did not address warrantless searches, Davies notes
the absence of eighteenth-century protests about warrantless searches. Id. at 603. However, the lack
of debate about warrantless house searches likely occurred because in early America, "the common
law apparently provided no justification for a search of a house beyond the ministerial execution
of a valid search warrant." Id. at 649. In other words, everyone agreed that warrantless house
searches were impermissible.
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V. BEYOND HOUSE SEARCHES: THE INCOHERENCE OF MODERN FOURTH
AMENDMENT DOCTRINE

The most plausible reading of the historical record leads to the
following conclusion: The framers intended that the Fourth Amendment
would apply only to physical searches of residences, pursuant to a general
warrant or no warrant at all. As discussed in Part I of this Article, modem
doctrine has rejected this interpretation.23 ' Instead, the Supreme Court has
sought to apply the Amendment to a wide variety of government evidencegathering activities.
The concluding section of this Article reviews three types of Fourth
Amendment cases that do not involve intrusions into residences-random
drug tests, sense-enhanced searches, and auto checkpoints. This review
does not yield encouraging results. The decisions in these cases seem
arbitrary, unpredictable, and ultimately incoherent.232

According to Davies's reading of the framers' intent, a search of a house pursuant to a general
warrant would be an "unreasonable search," as that term is used in the Fourth Amendment. Id. at
724. However, Davies asserts that a warrantless house search would not be an unreasonable search,
at least for Fourth Amendment purposes. See id. at 551. Given the profound common law tradition
that proscribed unauthorized entries into houses, I disagree with Davies's conclusion that the Fourth
Amendment did not proscribe warrantless house searches.
Davies and I also disagree on the implications of the framers' original intent for current Fourth
Amendment doctrine. Davies believes that a return to the original understanding of the Fourth
Amendment "would subvert the purpose the Framers had in mind when they adopted the text." Id.
at 741. Davies largely accepts the Supreme Court's rewriting of the Fourth Amendment because
today law enforcement officers exercise "a level of discretionary authority that the Framers would
not have expected a warrantless officer could exercise unless general warrants had been made
legal." Id.
I agree with Davies that unrestrained police discretion is undesirable. However, judicial
activism is not the only potential source for police restraint. Police discretion could be constrained
by elected officials who supervise police departments, by statutes, or by amendments to state
constitutions or the Federal Constitution.
In short, having nine appointed Supreme Court Justices reinvent the Fourth Amendment based
on their personal views about "unreasonable searches and seizures" is not the most sensible way
to regulate police discretion. Fourth Amendment doctrine is such a mess because well-intentioned
judges have invoked the Amendment in situations where it never was intended to apply. See infra
text accompanying notes 234-320 (discussing Fourth Amendment decisions that seem arbitrary and
incoherent).
231. See supra text accompanying notes 9-84.
232. While Fourth Amendment scholars may not agree on much, they almost universally agree
on the unsatisfactory state of current Fourth Amendment doctrine. See, e.g., Amar, Fourth
Amendment First Principles, supra note 88, at 757 ("The Fourth Amendment today is an
embarrassment."); Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV.
1468, 1468 (1985) ("The fourth amendment is the Supreme Court's tarbaby: a mass of
contradictions and obscurities that has ensnared the 'Brethren' in such a way that every effort to
extract themselves only finds them more profoundly stuck."); Erik G. Luna, Sovereignty and
Suspicion, 48 DUKE L.J. 787,787-88 (1999) (suggesting that each new Fourth Amendment doctrine
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This incoherence is unlikely to be solved by some minor tweaking of
Fourth Amendment doctrine. The chaos in Fourth Amendment doctrine has
resulted from attempts to apply the Fourth Amendment in situations where
the Amendment never was intended to apply. If one asked the framers of
the Fourth Amendment what the Amendment provided for with respect to
random drug tests, sense-enhanced searches, or auto checkpoints, the
answer would be "Nothing at all."
Of course, originalism is not the only method of constitutional
analysis.233 But in Fourth Amendment cases, it seems virtually impossible
to define "unreasonable searches and seizures" without reference to
history. As the subsequent cases vividly illustrate, no modem consensus
exists with respect to the propriety of random drug tests, sense-enhanced
searches, auto checkpoints, and a variety of other government evidencegathering activities.
Indeed, any modem agreement might be limited to the principle that
improper physical intrusions into residences violate the Fourth
Amendment. A search for some modem Fourth Amendment consensus
thus might lead to the same conclusion as a search for the original intent
of the framers-the Fourth Amendment prohibits improper physical
searches of residences, and that is all.
A. Random Drug Tests
Since 1989, the Supreme Court has reviewed six random drug test
cases.""' The Court has upheld four random drug test programs, while
concluding that two other programs violated the Fourth Amendment.235

"is more duct tape on the Amendment's frame and a step closer to the junkyard").
233. See, e.g., Maclin, Let Sleeping Dogs Lie, supra note 87, at 897 (arguing that the Supreme
Court no longer should consider historical evidence on the intent of the framers in Fourth
Amendment cases, "unless it is able to develop a more effective and consistent method by which
to do so").
234. See, e.g., Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-79 (1989)
(upholding random drug tests for some customs service employees); Skinner v. Ry. Labor
Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,618-34 (1989) (upholding random drug tests for railway workers).
235. See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822,828-38 (2002) (upholding random drug tests of
all students who participate in competitive extracurricular activities); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-65 (1995) (upholding random drug tests of students who participated in
interscholastic athletics); Nat '1TreasuryEmployees Union, 489 U.S. at 665-79 (upholding random
drug tests of some customs service employees); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 618-34 (upholding random
drug tests of railway workers); cf. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 76-86 (2001)
(holding that a random drug testing program for women who received prenatal care violated the
Fourth Amendment); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309-23 (1997) (holding that drug testing
of candidates for state office violated the Fourth Amendment).
For discussions of random drug testing cases, see Irene Merker Rosenberg, PublicSchool Drug
Testing: The Impact of Acton, 33 AM. CiuN. L. REV. 349 (1996); Jennifer Y. Buffaloe, Note,
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In distinguishing between permissible and impermissible random drug
test programs, the Court has emphasized two factors. First, the Justices
often have upheld random drug tests only after the government has
' For example, in
demonstrated that the tests serve "special needs."236
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass 'n, the Justices upheld random
drug testing of railway workers, based on the "governmental interest in
ensuring the safety of the traveling public and of the employees
'
themselves."237
Second, the Justices have not permitted the use of random drug test
results in criminal prosecutions. In Ferguson v. City of Charleston,238 the
Court struck down a random drug testing program for women receiving
prenatal care, where law enforcement authorities could receive positive
drug test results.23 9 Although the Court has emphasized the importance
both of special needs and of insulating random drug test results from law
enforcement officers, the random drug testing cases sometimes still seem
inconsistent and difficult to reconcile.
In Chandler v. Miller,24° the Justices struck down a Georgia statute,
which required that candidates for designated state offices must take a
urinalysis drug test prior to their nomination or election.24 ' In ruling that
the Georgia statute violated the Fourth Amendment, the Chandler Court
held that the state had not shown any "special need" for the drug test
policy.242 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg concluded: "Georgia asserts no
evidence of a drug problem among the State's elected officials, those
officials typically do not perform high-risk, safety-sensitive tasks, and the
'
required certification immediately aids no interdiction effort."243
Conversely, the Justices accepted a random drug test policy for high
school students in BoardofEducationv. Earls.2" Tecumseh High School
mandated urinalysis testing for any student who participated in competitive
extracurricular activities.245 The random drug tests applied not only to
students who participated in extracurricular athletics, but also to students

"Special Needs" and the Fourth Amendment: An Exception Poised to Swallow the Warrant
Preference Rule, 32 HARV. C.R. - C.L. L. REv. 529 (1997).
236. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620.
237. Id. at 621.
238. 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
239. Id. at 80 (holding that the drug testing program violated the Fourth Amendment, because
"the central and indispensable feature of the policy from its inception was the use of law
enforcement to coerce the patients into substance abuse treatment").
240. 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
241. Id. at 309-10.
242. Id. at 318.
243. Id. at 321-22.
244. 536 U.S. 822, 836 (2002).
245. Id. at 826.
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who were involved in activities such as choir, marching band, and the
Future Farmers of America.1 6 The Earlsmajority upheld the random drug
testing policy, concluding that "the nationwide drug epidemic makes the
war against drugs a pressing concern in every school. 247
The holdings in Earls and Chandler are difficult to reconcile. In
Chandler, the Court emphasized that the state had not demonstrated any
"concrete danger" of widespread illicit drug use among candidates for
public office.248 But in Earls, the state school board also failed to
demonstrate any "particularized or pervasive drug problem" among
Tecumseh High School students involved in extracurricular activities.249
Instead, as Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote in dissent: "Nationwide,
students who participate in extracurricular activities are significantly less
likely to develop substance abuse problems than are their less-involved
peers."2

°

In holding that random drug testing of candidates for public office
violated the Fourth Amendment, the Chandler Court emphasized that
elected state government officials "typically do not perform high-risk,
safety-sensitive tasks."2 '' But like these state officials, many of the students
tested in Earlswould not ordinarily pose any threat to others. Admittedly,
high school athletes who were under the influence of illicit drugs could
pose a genuine danger to others at sports competitions.252 However, a
member of the choir or the debate team who used illicit drugs probably
would not pose a danger to anyone but himself or herself.2" 3 In short, the
Court's random drug test decisions in Chandlerand Earls are difficult to
reconcile.
Given the Court's willingness to uphold a random drug testing program
in Earls, the lack of deference exhibited by the Justices in Chandler is
genuinely disturbing. In 1990, the Georgia Legislature approved the drug
254 The
testing statute that was subsequently invalidated in Chandler.
legislators undoubtedly were aware of the Fourth Amendment. These

246. Id.
247. Id. at 834. For a further discussion of the Earlsdecision, see Steinberg, High School Drug
Testing, supra note 5, at 269-70.
248. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318-19 (1997).
249. Earls,536 U.S. at 835.
250. Id. at 853 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
251. Chandler,520 U.S. at 321-22.
252. See Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 662 (1995) (holding that when
student athletes use drugs, "the risk of immediate physical harm to the drug user or those with
whom he is playing his sport is particularly high").
253. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 852 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (asserting that "the great majority
of students the School District seeks to test in truth are engaged in activities that are not safety
sensitive to an unusual degree").
254. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 309.
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lawmakers could make their own determination about whether a drug test
for public office candidates amounted to an unreasonable search. But in
Chandler,the Justices did not hesitate to substitute their own interpretation
of Fourth Amendment reasonableness for the approach endorsed by
Georgia's elected legislators---even though the Chandlerdecision was not
compelled by the text or the history of the Fourth Amendment. 5
B. Sense-EnhancedSearches
A sense-enhanced search involves "any police examination of a person
or his property through the use of some method that provides information
not available to unaided sensory perceptions."2"6 Like the drug-testing
rulings, the Supreme Court's decisions applying the Fourth Amendment to
sense-enhanced searches often seem contradictory and difficult to
reconcile." 7
A review of sense-enhanced search decisions reveals some themes that
appear frequently. For example, where law enforcement officers have used
sense-enhancing devices to reveal information about a residence, such
searches are particularly suspect.258 Further, the Court is more likely to
permit the warrantless use of a device that enhances visual observations,
as opposed to a device that enhances hearing. 9

255. See id. at 328 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Nothing in the Fourth Amendment or in any
other part of the Constitution prevents a State from enacting a statute whose principal vice is that
it may seem misguided or even silly to the Members of this Court.").
256. Steinberg, Making Sense of Sense-Enhanced Searches, supra note 6, at 563 n. 1.
257. For discussions of sense-enhanced search cases, see Melvin Gutterman, A Formulation
of the Value andMeans Models of the FourthAmendment in the Age of TechnologicallyEnhanced
Surveillance, 39 SYRACUSE L. REv. 647 (1988); Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders' Privacy:
The Fourth Amendment and the Power of Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1325
(2002); Ric Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo: A BlueprintforAdapting the Fourth Amendment to
Twenty-First Century Technologies, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1303 (2002); Steinberg, Making Sense of
Sense-EnhancedSearches, supra note 6.
258. Compare United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716-18 (1984) (holding that the
warrantless monitoring of a beeper inside of a residence violated the Fourth Amendment), and
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-41 (2001) (holding that when law enforcement officers did
not obtain a warrant before using a thermal imaging device to measure the amount of heat
emanating from a suspect's home, the officers violated the Fourth Amendment), with United States
v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280-85 (1983) (holding that where police officers monitored a beeper that
traveled through the public streets, such police conduct was not a search and did not require a
warrant).
259. CompareCalifornia v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,211-15 (1986) (holding that where police
officers used an airplane to view marijuana plants growing in a fenced backyard, the officers did
not engage in a Fourth Amendment search, and the officers did not need to obtain a warrant), with
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 317-59 (1967) (holding that the warrantless use of a wiretap
to monitor conversations from a public telephone booth violated the Fourth Amendment). But cf.
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 748-54 (1971) (holding that the warrantless use of a radio
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Despite these themes, the Supreme Court's sense-enhanced search
decisions often seem unpredictable and contradictory.2 60 In Kyllo v. United
States,161 the Supreme Court rejected the warrantless use of a thermal
imaging device to detect heat emanating from a house.262 The thermal
imaging device would inform police officers only about the temperature
263
inside of a residence, and would not reveal any other information.
Federal agents used the device to corroborate their suspicions that Danny
Kyllo was growing marijuana plants. 2 "
Writing for the majority, Justice Antonin Scalia began by observing that
the Fourth Amendment provides a high level of protection to residences. 65
Justice Scalia worried that the use of a thermal imaging unit might disclose
intimate details, such as "what hour each night the lady of the house takes
her daily sauna and bath."' 266 Justice Scalia also noted that when federal law
enforcement agents scanned the defendant's house with the thermal
imaging unit, the government was employing "a device that is not in
2 67
general public use, to explore details of the home.
The decision in Kyllo seems to conflict with an earlier decision in
UnitedStates v. Place.268 In Place,Drug Enforcement Agents used a drugdetecting dog to sniff the suspect's two luggage bags at Kennedy
Airport.2 69 The agents did not obtain a warrant before using the dog.27 ° The
drug-detecting dog reacted positively to the smaller bag.27 ' When the
agents opened the bag, they found more than 1000 grams of cocaine.2 72
transmitter concealed on an informant did not violate the Fourth Amendment); see also Steinberg,
Making Sense of Sense-Enhanced Searches, supra note 6, at 592-96 (discussing the Supreme
Court's different treatment of devices that augment a police officer's hearing and devices that
enhance an officer's sight).
260. See Steinberg, Making Sense of Sense-Enhanced Searches, supra note 6, at 564
(describing sense-enhanced search decisions, which seem "chaotic and unpredictable").
261. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
262. Id. at 33-41; see supra text accompanying notes 17-26 (discussing the Kyllo conclusion
that the use of a thermal imaging unit involved a "search," covered by the Fourth Amendment).
263. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 30 (noting that the thermal imaging unit "operates somewhat like
a video camera showing heat images").
264. Id. at 29-30. The agents ultimately found more than 100 marijuana plants in Kyllo's
residence. Id. at 30.
265. Id. at 31 (asserting that protection of residences lies at "'the very core' of the Fourth
Amendment") (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
266. Id. at 38.
267. Id. at 40; cf California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211-15 (1986) (holding that where
police officers viewed the defendant's backyard from an airplane using only their naked eyes, the
surveillance was not a Fourth Amendment "search" and did not require a warrant).
268. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
269. Id. at 699.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
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In Place, the Justices upheld the warrantless use of the drug-detecting
dog.273 In fact, the Court concluded that the canine sniff did not even
constitute "a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 2 74 In
reaching this conclusion, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor emphasized that
the canine sniff "does not require opening the luggage. ' 275 Further, the sniff
276
"discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item."
The decisions in Kyllo and Place seem difficult to reconcile. Both cases
involved a search technique that disclosed very limited information. In
Kyllo, the thermal imaging device revealed only the temperature inside of
only the presence
the suspect's home.277 In Place,the canine sniff revealed
278
of a controlled substance in the suspect's luggage.
Both cases also involved a sense-enhancing device that was not
frequently used, except by law enforcement officers. The Kyllo decision
explicitly noted that the thermal imaging device was "not in general public
use." 279 Of course, drug-detecting dogs also are not "in general public use."
Admittedly, federal agents scanned different types of property in Kyllo
and Place. In Kyllo, federal agents used the thermal imaging unit to scan
the interior of the suspect's home.28 Conversely, the Drug Enforcement
Agents in Place used the drug-detecting dog to sniff the suspect's luggage
at a public airport. 211
However, according to current Fourth Amendment doctrine, this
distinction should not lead to the different results in Kyllo and Place.
Admittedly, the Kyllo Court described the interior of a residence as "the
prototypical and hence most commonly litigated area of protected
privacy.''212 However, the Supreme Court also has held that individuals
a reasonable expectation of privacy in containers such as
possess 283
luggage. In fact, the Court typically requires that law enforcement

273. Id. at 706-07.
274. Id.at 707.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29-30 (2001).
278. Place, 462 U.S. at 699, 707. If anything, the canine sniff might be more intrusive than
the thermal imaging unit. Individuals ordinarily might regard the presence or absence of a
controlled substance as more sensitive and private than the temperature of their residences.
279. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
280. Id. at 34.
281. Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
282. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
283. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977) (holding that where aperson places
items in a locked footlocker, the person receives the same Fourth Amendment protection as "one
who locks the doors of his home against intruders").
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officers must obtain a warrant before opening luggage or similar
containers.284
In short, the decisions in Kyllo andPlace seem completely inconsistent.
Both cases involved the use of a sense-enhancing device that was not in
general public use, that did not require a physical trespass into a
constitutionally protected area, and that revealed only limited information.
And yet the cases reached opposite results. In Kyllo, the Court
invalidated the warrantless use of the thermal imaging unit. In Place, the
Court permitted the warrantless use of the drug-detecting dog. But the
Place Court went even further, concluding that use of the drug-detecting
dog was not even a "search" and was not covered by the Fourth
Amendment at all. 285 Ultimately, the Kyllo and Place decisions seem
impossible to reconcile.
C. Automobile Checkpoints
In a pair of relatively recent decisions, the Supreme Court has applied
the Fourth Amendment to automobile checkpoints, where police officers
stop each driver. As is the case in the random drug test cases and the senseenhanced search cases, these checkpoint decisions seem arbitrary and
difficult to reconcile.286
In Michigan Departmentof State Police v. Sitz, 287 the Court upheld a
Michigan sobriety checkpoint.2 8 Michigan state law enforcement officers
stopped every vehicle that passed through a fixed checkpoint. 289 At the
checkpoint, the officers checked each driver for obvious signs of

284. See, e.g., id. at 7-16 (holding that when federal agents seized a locked footlocker outside
of a train station, the agents should have obtained a warrant before they opened the footlocker); cf
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 569-81 (1991) (holding that where a police officer had
probable cause to believe that a paper bag in the trunk of a suspect's auto contained marijuana, the
police officer could open the paper bag without first obtaining a warrant); United States v. Ross,
456 U.S. 798, 804-25 (1982) (holding that where a police officer had probable cause to believe that
an automobile contained narcotics, the officer could open a paper bag in the trunk of the car without
first obtaining a warrant).
285. Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
286. For discussions of the Court's automobile checkpoint decisions, see generally Suzanne
Graves, Note, Checkpoints and the Fourth Amendment: Saving Grace or ConstitutionalMartyr?,
32 CONN. L. REv. 1487 (2000); Doug Reeder, Note, City of Indianapolis v. Edmond: The Supreme
Court Takes a Detour to Avoid Roadblock Precedent,40 Hous. L. REv. 577 (2003); Shannon S.
Schultz, Note, Edmond v. Goldsmith: Are Roadblocks Used to Catch Drug Offenders
Constitutional?,84 MARQ. L. REV. 571 (2000).
287. 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
288. Id. at 447-55.
289. Id.
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intoxication. 9 ° On average, each checkpoint stop lasted for about twentyfive seconds. 9 '
The Sitz Court held that the Michigan sobriety checkpoint program did
not violate the Fourth Amendment. 92 Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist
began by noting "the magnitude of the drunken driving problem," and "the
State's interest in eradicating it. ' 293 Balanced against this important state
interest, "the intrusion on motorists stopped briefly at sobriety
checkpoints-is slight., 294 Because officers at a checkpoint stopped "every
approaching vehicle,, 295 this policy served to "minimize the discretion of
the officers on the scene., 296 Justice Rehnquist also noted that because a
motorist at a fixed checkpoint is able to see police officers stopping other
vehicles, as well as "visible signs of the officers' authority," the motorist
'
is unlikely "to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion."297
298
In City of Indianapolisv. Edmond, the Court reviewed a narcotics
checkpoint program with many similarities to the checkpoint program
upheld in Sitz. In Edmond,police officers stopped a predetermined number
of vehicles at each checkpoint location.299 While checking each driver for
signs of impairment, an officer also looked for narcotics by conducting "an
open-view examination of the vehicle. ' '3° In addition, police officers led
a drug-detecting dog around the outside of each stopped vehicle.3 0 ' If the
officers did not find any evidence of narcotics or other criminal
misconduct, these auto stops lasted "two to three minutes or less. 30 2
The use of a drug-detecting dog in Edmond seemed like the only real
difference between the narcotics checkpoint in Edmond and the
constitutional sobriety checkpoint in Sitz. But as discussed above, 0 3 the
United States Supreme Court previously had held that a canine sniff is not

290. Id.
291. Id. at 448; see also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554-67 (1976)
(holding that where the Border Patrol stopped cars briefly at a fixed checkpoint to search for illegal
aliens, the checkpoint did not violate the Fourth Amendment).
292. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 447-55.
293. Id. at 451.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 453.
296. Id. at 452.
297. Id. at 453 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558 (1976)); cf
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 657 (1979) (roving patrols to check for unlicenced and unsafe
drivers violated the Fourth Amendment, in part because such patrols "may create substantial
anxiety" when the patrols stop motorists).
298. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
299. Id.at 35.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 36.
303. See supra text accompanying notes 268-76.
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covered by the Fourth Amendment at all.3" This holding was reaffirmed
in Edmond."5 Seemingly, a valid checkpoint procedure combined with a
constitutional canine sniff would result in a constitutional program.
Nonetheless, the Edmond Court held that the Indianapolis narcotics
checkpoints violated the Fourth Amendment. 0 6 The Court asserted that the
Indianapolis checkpoints resulted out of an improper "primary purpose."3 7
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor observed that "the Indianapolis checkpoint
program unquestionably has the primary purpose of interdicting illegal
narcotics."30 8 The Court only had approved checkpoints that were designed
"primarily to serve purposes closely related to the problems of policing the
border or the necessity of ensuring roadway safety." 3" In striking down the
Indianapolis narcotics checkpoint program, the Edmondmajority cautioned
against "exceptions to the general rule of individualized suspicion, '3 °
where a government program is designed primarily to serve law
enforcement interests.3 '
The Edmond decision raises a number of problems. First, in focusing
on the primary purpose served by the checkpoint program, the decision
seems to clash with other Fourth Amendment precedents. In Whren v.
United States, 312 the Court held that a police officer's subjective
motivations were irrelevant in a Fourth Amendment challenge, as long as
an auto stop was supported by probable cause derived from objective
facts. 13 Yet the Edmond Court rejected the checkpoint program solely
because the program resulted from what the Justices perceived to be an
improper purpose.314
Second, the Court's distinction between the valid sobriety checkpoint
in Sitz and the invalid narcotics checkpoint in Edmond suggests a highly
questionable balancing of private and public interests. In Sitz, during a
sobriety checkpoint that police officers operated for seventy-five minutes,
304. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
305. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40 (holding that a dog sniff is not a Fourth Amendment "search").
306. Id. at 40-48.
307. Id.at 48.
308. Id. at 40.
309. Id. at 41.
310. Id. at43.
311. Id.
312. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
313. See id. at 813 (holding that "the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops" does not
depend on "the actual motivations of the individual officers involved"); see also Atwater v.City
of Lago Vista, 532 U.S.318,346-47 (2001) (holding that amisdemeanor arrest did not violate the
Fourth Amendment,even though the arrest involved "gratuitous humiliations imposed by apolice
officer who was (at best) exercising extremely poor judgment").
314. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40 (asserting that the Indianapolis narcotics checkpoint program
violated the Fourth Amendment, because the program had "the primary purpose of interdicting
illegal narcotics").
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the officers arrested about 1.6% of the drivers who passed through the
checkpoint.315 In Edmond, during six narcotics checkpoints, about 9
percent of the auto stops resulted in arrests.3t 6
Except for the non-invasive canine sniff, the Edmond checkpoint stop
was no more intrusive than the checkpoint stop in Sitz. But because the
Edmondnarcotics checkpoint resulted in a much higher arrest rate than the
sobriety checkpoint in Sitz, the Edmond checkpoint arguably advanced
legitimate public interests to a greater extent than the Sitz checkpoint.
Although the Edmond Court rejected the Indianapolis narcotics checkpoint
program, the Indianapolis program would seem to have a better claim to
constitutionality than the sobriety checkpoint program upheld in Sitz.317

315. At the Saginaw County checkpoint, police officers stopped 126 vehicles and arrested two
drivers. Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 448 (1990).
316. At the Indianapolis checkpoints, police officers stopped 1161 vehicles and arrested 104
motorists. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 34-35.
317. Earlier this year, the United States Supreme Court reviewed another auto checkpoint in
Illinois v. Lidster, 124 S. Ct. 885 (2004). In Lidster, a bicyclist was killed in a hit-and-run accident
on an Illinois highway. Id. at 888. About one week after the fatal accident, police officers erected
a highway checkpoint "at about the same time of night and at about the same place" as the location
where the accident had occurred. Id. As each vehicle appreached the checkpoint, a police officer
stopped the car for about ten to fifteen seconds. The officer asked the occupants of each auto if they
possessed any information about the fatal hit-and-run accident. Police officers at the checkpoint
hoped to obtain "more information about the accident from the motoring public." Id.
As Robert Lidster approached the checkpoint, Lidster was driving his minivan erratically. After
a police officer smelled alcohol on Lidster's breadth, a second officer administered a sobriety test.
When Lidster failed the test, the officer arrested Lidster. Lidster eventually was convicted of driving
under the influence of alcohol. Id.
The Lidster Court upheld this crime scene checkpoint. The Court conceded that the crime scene
checkpoint promoted the state's "general interest in crime control," like the narcotics checkpoints
struck down in Edmond. Id. at 889. Nonetheless, the Justices held that the Lidster crime scene
checkpoint did not violate the Fourth Amendment, because the Lidster checkpoint involved an
"information-seeking kind of stop." Id. Writing for the Lidster majority, Justice Stephen Breyer
observed: "The stop's primary law enforcement purpose was not to determine whether a vehicle's
occupants were committing a crime, but to ask vehicle occupants, as members of the public, for
their help in providing information about a crime in all likelihood committed by others." Id.
The Lidster Court's attempt to distinguish Edmond is unconvincing. The "primary law
enforcement" purpose in Lidster was to catch the driver responsible for the hit-and-run accident.
Had police officers stopped this driver at the Lidster checkpoint, the driver unquestionably would
have been detained and probably would have been prosecuted. And police officers did not stop
Robert Lidster to solicit his help "in providing information about a crime." The officers stopped
Lidster to prosecute Lidster for drunk driving.
The Lidster Court also cautioned that courts assessing checkpoints must judge each
checkpoint's "reasonableness, hence its constitutionality, on the basis of the individual
circumstances." Id. at 890. The vagueness of this non-standard provides virtually no guidance to
police departments contemplating checkpoints, or to lower courts reviewing police checkpoints.
The Lidster decision seems certain to generate more checkpoint litigation, with unpredictable and
chaotic results.
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Finally, the decisions in Sitz and Edmond suggest that rulings on the
constitutionality of auto checkpoints may turn on fine factual distinctions.
Assume that the hypothetical municipality of Hulls Cove institutes a fixed
sobriety checkpoint designed to identify drunk drivers. Only one fact
distinguishes the Hulls Cove sobriety checkpoint from the sobriety
checkpoint program upheld in Sitz. During brief auto stops at the Hulls
Cove checkpoint, police officers lead a drug-detecting dog around each car.
Ordinarily, the canine sniff does not extend the length of the detention. But
if the dog signals that illicit drugs
are present in the auto, police will detain
318
the driver and search the car.
The hypothetical Hulls Cove checkpoint program seems to fall
somewhere in between the lawful sobriety checkpoint in Sitz and the
unlawful narcotics checkpoint in Edmond. Would the Hulls Cove
checkpoint violate the Fourth Amendment? It is impossible to say.
This uncertainty should be worrisome. Assume that police officers or
lawmakers guess wrong and implement a program that violates the Fourth
Amendment. Under the exclusionary rule, any evidence obtained through
such an unconstitutional program ordinarily will be suppressed. 319 Highly
probative evidence will be excluded from criminal trials, leading to the
acquittal of defendants who otherwise would be convicted. In an attempt
to prevent such results, the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment decisions
often have emphasized the importance of providing police officers with
bright line rules that clearly identify permissible searches and seizures.32°
With respect to roadblocks, the absence of such clear rules inevitably will
lead to law enforcement errors, the exclusion of evidence, and the inability
to convict obviously guilty defendants.

318. This hypothetical is based on a problem published by James Tomkovicz and Welsh
White. See JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ & WELSH S. WHITE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRAINTS UPON INVESTIGATION AND PROOF 411, Note 3 (4th ed. 200 1).
319. See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) (holding that if illegally
obtained items may be "held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the
protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such searches and
seizures is of no value"); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-57 (1961) (holding that the
exclusionary rule applies in state court cases).
320. See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001) (holding that in
interpreting the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court should "draw standards sufficiently clear
and simple to be applied with a fair prospect of surviving judicial second-guessing months and
years after an arrest or search is made"); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981) (holding
that where police officers search an automobile incident to an arrest, the officers must be able to
apply "'[a] single, familiar standard"' (alteration in original) (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442
U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979))).
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D. Summary
Attempts to apply the Fourth Amendment to random drug tests, senseenhanced searches, and roadblocks have resulted in chaotic and
unpredictable decisions. In these cases, the Supreme Court has announced
arbitrary decisions that rarely refer to Fourth Amendment history and make
little sense as a matter of public policy.
After reviewing these seemingly arbitrary and irreconcilable Fourth
Amendment cases, the reader must ask how the Supreme Court has
performed so poorly in this area. 2 In interpreting the United States
Constitution, the Court has many advantages over police officers in the
field, or even the lower courts. Supreme Court Justices are carefully
selected and subjected to a rigorous confirmation process.322 The Court's
jurisdiction is almost entirely discretionary, with the Justices handling a
relatively limited docket.323 Each Justice has the assistance of several law
clerks, whom the Justices choose from the best and the brightest law
school graduates. 324 Despite all of these advantages, the Court's Fourth
Amendment opinions often border on incoherence.
A review of history provides new insight into the Supreme Court's
Fourth Amendment quagmire. When the Court issues a Fourth
Amendment ruling on issues such as random drug testing, sense-enhanced
searches, or automobile checkpoints, the Justices are invoking the Fourth
Amendment in situations where the Amendment never was intended to
apply. If one accepts the inapplicability of the Fourth Amendment in these
situations, the chaotic nature of the Court's Fourth Amendment
interpretations is less difficult to explain.

321. For further criticisms ofthe Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, see sources cited
supra note 232.
322. For discussions of the modem Supreme Court confirmation process, see Henry Paul
Monaghan, The Confirmation Process: Law or Politics?, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1202, 1203-12
(1988); Ronald D. Rotunda, The ConfirmationProcessfor Supreme CourtJustices in the Modern
Era, 37 EMORY L.J. 559, 562-86 (1988); David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the
Constitution,and the Confirmation Process, 101 YALE L.J. 1491, 1494-1520 (1992).
323. See, e.g., LISAA. KLOPPENBERG, PLAYINGIT SAFE: HOWTHE SUPREMECOURT SIDESTEPS
HARD CASES AND STUNTS THE DEVELOPMENTOF LAW4 (2001) (reporting that the Supreme Court

agrees to review only about one percent of the cases that reach the Court through a petition for
certiorari).
324. See, e.g., Mark R. Brown, Gender Discriminationin the Supreme Court's Clerkship
Selection Process, 75 OR. L. REv. 359, 362 (1996) (noting that former Supreme Court clerks
"practice in the nation's best law firms, teach in its best law schools, hold plum public-sector
appointments, and on occasion rise again to the Supreme Court").
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VI. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has read the Fourth Amendment phrase
"unreasonable searches and seizures" in a very different way than the
framers of the Constitution intended. The Court typically has concluded
that any government evidence-gathering activity constitutes a "search or
seizure," where the government activity affects a suspect's reasonable
expectation of privacy. The Court's distinctions between cases that
implicate the Fourth Amendment and cases that do not are chaotic and
difficult to reconcile.
When the framers used the phrase "unreasonable searches and
seizures," the framers actually were referring to a narrow, specific problem.
In short, the framers intended that the Fourth Amendment would prohibit
only unlawful physical searches of houses, pursuant to a general warrant
or no warrant at all. The framers never intended that the Amendment
would somehow govern the many other complex problems raised by police
investigations of criminal misconduct.
The previous section of this Article examines some of the Supreme
Court's relatively recent attempts to address new Fourth Amendment
problems. After reviewing the seemingly arbitrary and sometimes
incoherent results in these cases, it is difficult to remain optimistic about
the current Court's Fourth Amendment activism.
In the vast majority of cases where the Supreme Court today attempts
to apply the Fourth Amendment, the Amendment simply never was
intended to apply. A change in the membership of the Court, or a tweaking
of Fourth Amendment doctrine, will not repair the Court's search and
seizure jurisprudence. The Justices may restore sensibility to Fourth
Amendment analysis only by returning to the original understanding of the
Amendment.
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